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Abstract 
 
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has placed an increased focus 
upon government and private agencies to engage in surveillance practices in order to combat 
terrorism. The passing of the United States PATRIOT ACT (2001) expanded the surveillance 
capabilities of law enforcement officials thus allowing both federal and state agencies to legally 
wiretap a range of communication devices. Under the justification of “fighting terrorism,” 
federal and state agencies now have more access to sensitive data on/about a range of persons 
including subjects of interest. Legal scholars (Bam, 2015, as well as the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), have questioned the constitutionality of the advancement of surveillance 
practices in government agencies including the role private agencies play in assisting federal 
agencies in criminal investigations. Even so, research dedicated to how the public understands 
the expansion of state and federal surveillance capabilities, and connections to private entities, is 
under studied.  
Using the Globalization of Personal Data (GPD) survey questionnaire from Surveillance, 
Privacy, and the Globalization of Personal Information by Elia Zureik, the goal of this research 
project is to identify how individuals in the United States perceive the transfer of their personal 
data between government and private agencies. Through non-probability online quota sampling 
methods (Singleton and Straits, 2005), responses from participants stratified into five different 
racial stratums are analyzed and used to examine the extent to which citizens in the United States 
are either concerned or unconcerned about surveillance practices used by government (state and 
federal) and private agencies. In order to examine the impact that levels of knowledge and 
awareness of current surveillance technology and legislative policies has on citizens’ concerns,  
iv 
 
this research project also seeks to examine important socio-demographic differences between 
respondents. Ultimately, this research represents an attempt to establish a dialogue for future 
policy makers discussing how citizens perceive the “dataveillance” capabilities of government 
and private agencies, and whether current legislation goes far enough to protect citizens from 
unreasonable government intrusions.  
Keywords: surveillance, data, privacy 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In a crime analytics bureau, a police officer logs in to see what alerts have been posted by social media 
software designed to spot potential threats within the billions of daily online tweets, pins, likes, and posts. 
On the street, a police officer uses body-worn cameras to scan a crowd; the feed is sent in real time back 
to police department where facial recognition and movement analysis software alerts the patrol officer as 
to whether furtive movements or people on watch lists have been identified. Police follow up on these 
alerts to identify people who should be immediately investigated. Other people are dismissed as not 
posing an immediate threat but are logged on watch lists for future references. No police department has 
all of this technological ability today but some will soon (Joh 2015).1 
 
The depicted scenario above, written by Professor Elizabeth Joh from the University of 
California, Davis School of Law, is an example of potential future surveillance capabilities of 
law enforcement agencies in the United States. Joh (2015) states that police departments 
currently do not possess all forms of surveillance technology mentioned, however the possibility 
of police agencies obtaining such technology is not as far off into the future as one might have 
originally presumed.  
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has shifted law enforcement 
priorities towards combatting terrorism. Law enforcement agencies have in turn moved from 
traditional policing strategies (e.g. hot spot policing or community policing) into what is referred 
to as “intelligence led policing” or “big data policing,” ultimately changing the way in which 
agencies engage in the preliminary stages of police investigations over the past fifteen years 
(Haggerty, Lyon, and Ball, 2014).2   
Untied States lawmakers have responded to perceived global terrorism and crime threats 
by modifying established civil privacy protections allowing for more invasive law enforcement 
policing tactics (Cole, 2003). By modifying privacy protections, citizens in the United States 
                                                
1 See Edwen Chan & Alex Dobuzinskis. U.S. Police Struggle to Uncover Threats on Social Media, Reuters (2014). 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-socialmedia-idUSKBN0K40MD20141226 
2 Ball, K., Haggerty, K. D., & Lyon, D. (2014). Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies. Routledge. 
2 
 
have both knowingly and unknowingly substituted their individual civil liberties in order to 
allow state and federal law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism through surveillance 
methods (Lippert, 2015). Changes in law enforcement practices within both federal and state 
agencies occurred after the establishment of The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
the passing of The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, also referred to as the PATRIOT Act (“Patriot 
Act” throughout). The establishment of DHS and the passing of the Patriot Act required federal, 
state, and private agencies to interact together, thus creating what is referred to as the Homeland 
Security Era of Policing (Monahan, 2010). The following subsections of this introduction will 
better define surveillance, data mining, privacy and how these concepts are related to current law 
enforcement practices across the United States.  
Conceptualizing Surveillance 
According to Kevin Haggerty (2014), surveillance can be defined as any systematic focus 
on personal information in order to influence, manage, entitle, or control those whose 
information is being collected. The information that is being collected through surveillance is 
referred to as “data.” Some examples of data include bank records, driver’s licenses, social 
security numbers, credit scores, browser history, or social media accounts. Essentially, every 
activity that is conducted online can be classified and stored as data, creating a personal online 
data footprint or “data double” that is unique to each of our individual identities (Haggerty & 
Ericson, 2006). 
The information that is collected online is typically stored by private agencies (i.e. Apple, 
Google, Wells Fargo, etc.) and allows each company to monitor and improve their online 
platform by keeping track of capital and consumer feedback. The data society provides to private 
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agencies has become useful to government agencies. Since 2001, private agencies have been 
found assisting government agencies in law enforcement investigations by supplying them with 
citizens’ personal data.  
The sharing of personal data between government and private agencies is described as a 
surveillance assemblage, in which both agencies collect and gather data on people or things 
(Haggerty, Ball, Lyon 2012). Society is somewhat alarmed by the concept of the surveillance 
assemblage. Specifically, this is attributed to federal/local law enforcement agencies not needing 
a warrant in order to ask private agencies for assistance in accessing citizens’ personal data 
(Bambauer, 2016). The assemblage can be referred to as “data mining,” which is the compiling 
of information from a variety of sources in order to proactively identify unknown threats from a 
population in order to predict or prevent criminal activity (Slobogin, 2008). Data mining is how 
federal and state law enforcement agencies possess what is referred to as “big data” (Bambauer, 
2016). Federal and state law enforcement agencies share data through interconnected systems 
developed by private agencies and are able to request data from non-law enforcement agencies 
(i.e. private sector agencies). This research focuses on the sharing of data between government 
and private sector agencies, and is referred to as “surveillance” throughout this study.  
Conceptualizing Privacy 
Allowing federal, state, and private agencies access to the same interconnected 
surveillance systems which possess the personal data of citizens has led to a blurring of 
boundaries between what can be considered private versus public information (Monahan, 2010).  
Robert Smith, editor of the Privacy Journal, defines privacy as, “the desire by each of us for 
physical space where we can be free from interruption, intrusion, embarrassment, or 
accountability and the attempt to control the time and manner of disclosures of personal 
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information about ourselves.”3 Similarly, the ultimate goal of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution is to protect individual privacy from arbitrary government intrusion.  
The Fourth Amendment asserts, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The 
ability for federal and state law enforcement agencies to access the data of citizens across the 
United States through surveillance tactics has been argued by legal scholars (Bambauer, 2016; 
Joh, 2015; Slobogin, 2007), sociologists (Ball, 2003; Haggerty, 2005; Lyon, 2004; Wood, 2003), 
the American Civil Liberties Union, and many other intersectional academics as a potential 
invasion of reasonable privacy expectations. 
Current Study 
Over the last sixteen years, government and private agencies have engaged in a 
surveillance assemblage in order to predict and prevent future terrorist attacks. Until 2013, the 
extent and involvement of the private sector in government investigations was relatively unclear. 
In 2013, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed that the government and private 
sector agencies were engaging in surveillance on all citizens in the United States through the 
bulk collection and storage of “meta data4” (e.g. phone numbers called, and the time and place 
the phone call was received, etc.).5 Since the Snowden revelations, society has expressed 
opposition towards the collection of bulk data by the government as well as concerns about not 
being able to control the amount of personal information being collected on them by private 
                                                
3 See Privacy and Human Rights 2003. An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Developments. 
4 Meta data can be defined as a set of data that describes and gives information about other data  
5 See Lyon (2015) “The Snowden Stakes; Challenges for Understanding Surveillance Today.” Surveillance & Society.  
5 
 
sector agencies (Slobogin & Schumacher, 1993; Slobogin, 2008; Zureik et al., 2010; Smith & 
Lyon, 2013; Gao, 2015, Raine & Maniam, 2016).  
Building upon previous research conducted by the Globalization of Personal Data project 
at Queens University, the goal of this research is to compare and contrast previous findings to 
current findings based on a sample of individuals who were under represented in the 2014 survey 
(e.g. African Americans, Hispanics, Pacific Islanders, and Two or More Races/Other). In order 
to evaluate potential demographic differences that might exist regarding opinions about the 
sharing of personal data between government and private agencies, analyses will include a range 
of responses from different “stratums” of the U.S. population.  
Specifically, this research elaborates on the 2014 GPD study by sampling individuals of 
different socio-demographic backgrounds and by focusing solely upon citizens in the United 
States. This will be accomplished through the utilization of the online survey platform 
“Qualtrics” which will ask recruited respondents close-ended questions about their: 1) individual 
awareness of existing technology, 2) individual reaction to and experience with specific privacy 
and surveillance related technologies, 3) individual reaction to big events or privacy issues, and 
4) individual articulation of how to balance privacy and national security.  
The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding on how individuals in the 
United States perceive government and private agencies’ surveillance capabilities and to explore 
whether or not, and to what extent, demographic differences exists between respondents. This 
research will bring citizens’ voices back into the privacy versus security debate. Specifically, by 
asking respondents their individual articulation of how to balance privacy and national security, 
as well as their reaction to private and government agencies’ abilities to access their personal 
data.  
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Additionally, potential policy implications from this research could provide the Supreme 
Court and future legislators with examples of which government and private agencies 
dataveillance capabilities are most concerning for citizens in that they potentially violate the 
reasonable privacy expectation standard. Overall, this study seeks to elaborate and expand the 
GPD project by using select questions from their survey instrument and sampling individuals of 
different socio-demographic backgrounds in order to create a more inclusive dialogue about 
privacy, surveillance, and data mining after 9-11.  
The following chapters will first provide a review of the literature analyzing Fourth 
Amendment privacy rulings before 9-11, the passing of the Patriot Act and the establishment of 
the Department of Homeland Security after 9-11. Then, a review of research related to 
surveillance and privacy will include the following conversations about fusions centers (i.e. hubs 
where local, state, federal and private agencies share data to predict and prevent crime) and past 
research on citizens’ opinions of surveillance and privacy. 6  Next, a review of theoretical 
perspectives will explore how surveillance can be a tool for social control through both panoptic 
and non-panoptic forms of surveillance as well as how social networks can delineate whether 
individuals should have reasonable expectations of privacy. Lastly, the results of this thesis will 
be discussed in comparison to previous research as well as in terms of future research directions 
and potential policy implications. 
 
 
 
                                                
6 According to the Department of Homeland Security’s website fusion centers operate as state and major urban area focal points 
for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat related information between federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(SLTT), and provide private sector partners. Website: https://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LEGAL LITERATURE 
Privacy Before 9-11: Supreme Court Rulings Involving the Fourth Amendment 
 Prior to the 2001 legislative changes, a Fourth Amendment search occurred when the 
government infringed upon expectations of privacy that society deemed as reasonable7. 
Historically, the philosophical underpinning of the creation of the Fourth Amendment came from 
the societal needs and values of the colonists, who were seeking to suppress abuses during the 
British colonial period (Weaver, 2015). Specifically, the colonists felt that the government had 
the power to engage in search at any time without having to specify what was being searched or 
the place of the search. The adoption of the Fourth Amendment changed the government’s 
ability engage in unreasonable searches requiring officials to at the very minimum have 
established probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, as well as be able to describe the 
place and the item that was to be seized (p. 234). Although the Fourth Amendment was able to 
protect individuals in traditional searches, as society and technology both began to advance, the 
limitations of the amendment became increasingly more noticeable.  
As technology began to develop throughout the 1920’s (e.g. detectaphones, spike mikes, 
wiretaps) law enforcement agencies began using technology to assist in their investigations. The 
ability for the Fourth Amendment to protect citizens from law enforcement searches deploying 
technology became increasingly limited. For example, in Olmstead vs. United States (1928)8 the 
Supreme Court ruled against Olmstead when law enforcement wiretapped telephone lines 
outside of Olmstead’s home, citing that neither the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated nor had a search been performed. However, almost four decades after the Olmstead 
                                                
7 See Katz vs United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 351.  
8 See Olmstead vs United States (1928) 277 U.S. at 455-57. 
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ruling, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Silverman9 when law enforcement 
officials placed a microphone in the defendants’ household without obtaining a warrant. The 
concurring opinion of the court suggests that Olmstead was not protected because law 
enforcement utilized telephone lines outside of the defendant’s home, strategically avoiding 
entering a constitutionally protected area. In comparison, the court ruled in favor of Silverman 
because law enforcement accessed the home without obtaining permission. 
The most significant Supreme Court ruling associated with the Fourth Amendment 
occurred six years after Silverman. The ruling of Katz vs. United States (1967) lead to a change 
in the way the Fourth Amendment conceptualizes privacy and also overturned the original 
Olmstead decision.  
In Katz, the defendant occupied a public phone booth in which he illegally transmitted 
gambling wages, which was being wiretapped by the FBI. The defendant challenged his 
conviction, citing that the records obtained by the FBI constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. Significantly, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Katz. Justice Harlem’s 
concurring opinion altered societal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by stating:  
“I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only that an enclosed telephone booth is an area 
where, like a home, Weeks vs. United States 232 U.S. 383, and unlike a field, Hester vs. United States, 265 
U.S. 57, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; that electronic as well 
as physical intrusion into a place that is in the sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is as the Court 
has long held, presumptively unreasonable” (Katz v United States: 389 U.S. 347, 351).  
 
The year following the Katz ruling, the Supreme Court began interpreting Harlem’s 
statement as the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test consisting of two prongs. The first 
prong asserts that the government must contravene an individual’s actual subjective expectation 
of privacy. The second prong assumes that the expectation must also be reasonable in the sense 
                                                
9 See Silverman vs. United States (1961) 365 U.S. at 506-507.  
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that society in general would recognize it as such. The Katz ruling demonstrates the importance 
of societal norms and values being taken into consideration when deciding whether a violation of 
privacy has occurred. The Supreme Court applies subjective expectation of privacy as well as 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court has often ruled in favor of using technology 
collectively in searches against citizens. Thus, historically, the Supreme Court has been 
supportive of law enforcement engaging in searches so long as investigators were able to secure 
a warrant prior to the search. 
 Past Supreme Court rulings beginning with Smith vs. Maryland (1979)10 held that the 
installation of a pen register (also referred to as a dialed number recorder) did not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court argued that because the information 
would have been disclosed and able to be accessed by a third party (e.g. phone carrier), the 
government did not need a warrant to obtain the phone numbers dialed by the defendant. This 
ruling is often cited in current cases involving the legality for federal, state, and private agencies 
to access personal data (e.g. cell phone calls, banking transaction, social media, emails), however 
the Supreme Court still does not recognize such access to personal data as an invasion of privacy 
because the information is disclosed and accessible via third party.  
 Although the Supreme Court does not recognize surveillance through data mining as an 
invasion of privacy, the court ruled in 2001 in favor of Kyllo11 that the use of thermal imaging on 
a private residence without a warrant is unconstitutional. The court ruled in favor of Kyllo basing 
their reasoning on the inability for an average citizen to be able to obtain the same technology, 
suggesting that when law enforcement agencies use invasive technology like thermal imaging 
without obtaining a warrant or probable cause first it is then that an individuals’ reasonable 
                                                
10 See Smith vs Maryland (1979) 442 U.S. 735, 744-45  
11 See Kyllo vs United States (2001) 533 U.S. 40 
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expectation of privacy has been violated. The court’s ruling is relevant here because the ability to 
engage in surveillance through data mining is also a form of technology that cannot be conducted 
by the average citizen.  
 While these two Supreme Court cases demonstrate issues involving technology, it is 
interesting that, in Kyllo, the Supreme Court applied the reasonable expectation of privacy where 
the Smith case did not. Specifically, the Supreme Court ruling of Smith did not discuss how a 
reasonable individual might perceive the government’s ability to acquire the numbers they dialed 
as an intrusive search. Rather, the court only argued that individuals disclose this information to 
a third party and ruled that the information should not be considered private. Essentially, this 
ruling suggests that the ability for law enforcement to request citizen’s third party data is neither 
intrusive nor unreasonable. Therefore, the court ruled that the information should not be 
considered private and the ability to access citizen’s data from a third party is neither intrusive 
nor unreasonable. However, the Supreme Court failed to address the issues surrounding whether 
the information being disclosed from an individual’s personal phone should legally be able to be 
accessed by the federal and state law enforcement agencies without a warrant or probable cause.  
As time has progressed, it appears the Supreme Court has taken a step back from incorporating 
societal norms and values when deciding whether defendants have reasonable expectations of 
privacy. This trend has been seen most often in recent Supreme Court rulings on privacy (see 
next section).  
The reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of not including the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard can mainly be attributed to technology advancements 
as well as not having defined legislative policies of illegal uses of technology by government and 
private sector agencies (Slobogin, 2008). It has become harder for the Supreme Court to 
11 
 
incorporate the reasonable expectation of privacy standard since the passing of the Patriot Act in 
2001. The debate over privacy versus security in terms of terrorism is often argued by United 
States lawmakers in order to rationalize why reasonable expectations should not necessarily 
matter when trying to curb terrorism. The following section will provide an overview of the 
legislative changes that have taken place since 9-11, and will analyze how such changes have 
impacted individual privacy and have increased surveillance in federal and state government 
agencies.  
Privacy After 9-11: The USA Patriot Act 
 According to surveillance scholar Priscilla Regan,12 “The USA Patriot Act amends 
virtually every information privacy statute to facilitate access, increase data collection, and 
reduce the due process and privacy protections for record subjects” (p. 482). The Patriot Act was 
passed in 2001 only forty-five days after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The passing of the 
Patriot Act enabled federal and state law enforcement agencies to legally use wiretaps on 
communication and access sensitive data on citizens, so long as such usage is justified as aiding 
an ongoing terrorism investigation. The legislation passed with unanimous support in 2001 and 
has been re-authorized twice. The first re-authorization occurred in 2006 by President George 
Bush and the second re-authorization occurred in 2011 by President Barack Obama.  
 The American Civil Liberties Union13 expresses similar concerns as Professor Regan, 
stating that the legislation makes it easier for law enforcement agencies to spy on ordinary 
Americans by expanding their authority to monitor phone and email communications, bank 
records, credit reporting records, and the activity of innocent Americans on the Internet. Some of 
                                                
12 Regan P, M. (2004). Old issues, new context: Privacy, information collection, and homeland security. Government Information 
Quarterly, 21(4), 481-497.  
13 ACLU (2016). “Surveillance Under the Patriot Act.” Link: https://www.aclu.org/infographic/surveillance-under-patriot-act 
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the most controversial aspects of the Patriot Act include the use of National Security Letters 
(NSLs), which are administered by FBI agents, without the approval of a judge, in order to 
obtain personal data (i.e. phone records, computer records, banking history and credit history) 
from private agencies. The Patriot Act prohibits both individuals and agencies that receive NSLs 
from telling anyone about the order through the creation of gag order provisions, which have 
been found unconstitutional in many cases (e.g. Doe vs. Holder, Internet Archive vs. Mukasey, 
and Library Connection vs. Gonzalez)14 due to obstruction of constitutional First and Fourth 
Amendments rights  
Between the years 2003-2006, the FBI issued 192,499 NSL’s. Over the course of those 
three years, the FBI was only able to obtain one conviction related to terrorism.15 The ability for 
government agencies to administer NSL’s without obtaining the approval of a judge has allowed 
for any individual in the U.S. to have their third party data accessed prior to actually committing 
or being charged for a crime. This has led to government agencies using NSL’s for not only 
crimes involving terrorism, but also crimes unrelated to terrorism (e.g. money laundering, 
immigration, fraud, and drugs). Essentially, the passing of the Patriot Act in 2001 has widened 
the net for the type of investigations for which government agencies can subpoena personal data. 
Third party data can be subpoenaed on all citizens for all investigations through the issuance of 
an NSL to a private agency. Thus, subjects of investigations are left completely unaware that 
their data is being handed over by private agencies and government agencies are allowed to 
request as much data as needed.  
Privacy After 9-11: The Department of Homeland Security 
                                                
14 See the American Civil Liberties Website for more information on the three cases. Link: https://www.aclu.org/other/national-
security-letters?redirect=nsl 
15 ACLU (2016). “Surveillance Under the Patriot Act.” Link: https://www.aclu.org/infographic/surveillance-under-patriot-act 
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 by combining 22 
separate federal agencies (e.g. United States Citizen and Immigration Services, United States 
Customs and Border Patrol, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security 
Administration, United States Secret Service, and many more) in order to better secure the nation 
from potential threats.16 The establishment of DHS led to the creation of  “fusion centers” which 
are often also referred to as “intelligence centers” or “information analysis centers.”  Fusion 
centers are located within state and local police departments and encompass officials from 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, other state and local government entities, the 
federal intelligence community, the military, as well as private companies.17 This combination of 
federal, state, and local private companies is important to understanding the surveillance 
assemblage that currently exists within government and private agencies.  
As of 2010, it was reported that there are 72 fusion centers in the United States. 
According to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 2012, total spending on fusion 
centers since 2003 has totaled 1.4 billion dollars. Attorney General Eric Holder (2010) asserts 
that fusion centers are vital to combatting the war on terror stating, “We are at war. This is the 
reality in which we live and our fusion centers are on the frontlines of America’s best and most 
effective efforts to fight back.”18 Most citizens (when asked about DHS or fusions centers), 
report not being knowledgeable about their function or role in local law enforcement 
investigations (Monahan, 2010). Essentially, this signifies that many are unaware about the 
provisional changes that took place after 9/11. Citizens that report not being knowledgeable 
about the DHS or fusion centers are thus unaware of the extent to which government agencies 
                                                
16 See the Department of Homeland Security’s Website. Link: https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs 
17 See the ACLU’s website: More About Fusion Centers:  https://www.aclu.org/other/more-about-fusion-centers?redirect=more-
about-fusion-centers 
18 Monahan, Torin (2010). The future of Security? Surveillance Operations at Homeland Security Fusion Centers. Social Justice, 
37(2/3), 84-98.  
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are able to access their personal data and potentially is an important variable that could influence 
support of government and private agencies’ surveillance capabilities.  
The following section will provide a review of research related to surveillance and 
privacy. The review will cover previous research that has been conducted on fusion centers, 
acceptable searches under the Fourth Amendment, and public opinion surveys about privacy and 
surveillance in the United States.   
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
Agencies Created After 9-11: Fusion Centers 
Fusion centers are depicted as “data combaters” for criminal activity because they are 
essentially the liaison for data sharing between federal, state, and private agencies (Monahan & 
Regan, 2012). They were created to improve the sharing of anti-terrorism intelligence within 
state, local and federal law enforcement agencies, but their mission has broadened over time. 
Fusion centers analyze not only criminal intelligence but also public and private sector data 
(German & Stanley, 2007). However, the sharing of data between public and private sectors is 
potentially problematic for civil privacy rights. American law entitles citizens to a, “fundamental 
expectation of privacy,” but this protection has been affected due to the legislative changes that 
took place after 9/11 and the implementation of counter-terrorism policies (Bloss, 2007 p. 212). 
German and Stanley (2007)19 argue that the collection and sharing of intelligence information 
about U.S. citizens should be handled with the utmost care. Specifically, they argue that fusion 
centers need to be accountable as well as transparent because of the massive amount of data 
being generated and collected within security agencies every day (p. 3).  
According to German and Stanley (2007) there are five potential problems with fusion 
centers. First, fusion centers have ambiguous lines of authority, which allows for policy shopping. 
For example, due to fusion centers having representatives from federal, state and local agencies, 
there is ambiguity over which agency has primary control. This can lead to policy shopping, which 
is when officials pick and choose from overlapping sets of laws in order to collect personal 
                                                
19 German & Stanley (2007). What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? Link: 
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf 
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information as freely as possible, avoiding privacy laws, open record acts, and civil liability (p. 
10).  
Second, fusion centers incorporate private sector agencies into the intelligence process, 
eroding the relationship that protects the privacy of citizens who are employees or customers of 
these companies (p. 3). Third, the participation of active-duty military personnel in fusion centers 
potentially eliminates the long-standing American tradition which prohibits the U.S. military from 
acting in a law enforcement capacity on U.S. soil unless authorized by Congress (see the Posse 
Comitatus Act of 1878). German and Stanley (2007) argue that the involvement of the military is 
increasingly more dangerous when government officials use an exaggerated rhetoric of terrorism, 
in order to scare citizens into abandoning their civil liberties (p. 15). Fourth, the use of data mining 
tactics will inevitably lead to many citizens being flagged, scrutinized, investigated, placed on 
watch lists, interrogated or arrested due to incorrect algorithms generating false positives (p. 15). 
Fifth, fusion centers are excessively secret, meaning that it is often hard for state and local law 
enforcement agencies to obtain the clearances needed to receive information gathered by fusion 
center analysts in a timely matter (p. 20).  
Issues with fusion center functioning previously mentioned by German and Stanley 
(2007) were also found in the research conducted by Craven, Monahan, and Regan in 2015. 
Craven et al. (2015) communicated with fusion center officials through interviews and emails to 
discuss fusion center involvement in the monitoring of the Occupy Wall Street protests. They 
discovered that during the Occupy Wall Street protests, which occurred in cities throughout the 
U.S. in 2011-2012, fusion center analysts had the power to direct their activities and target 
certain members of society without breaking privacy laws (p. 7).  
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Through evidence from email communications and the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) fusion centers, along with the FBI and the DHS, were actively monitoring the 
constitutionally protected activities of Occupy protestors throughout various U.S. cities. Fusion 
centers initially argued that their main concern with the Occupy protests was public safety. 
However, as early as a month before the protests were launched, the New York FBI met with 
representatives of the New York Stock Exchange to discuss the planned protests. The FBI 
contacted private businesses to alert them that they might be targets of upcoming Occupy Wall 
Street protests, thus demonstrating the power that private agencies play in government 
organizations (Craven et al. 2015, p. 10). This form of information sharing with private entities 
demonstrates the complicated relationship fusion centers have with the private sector as well as 
the responsibility to uphold and protect civil liberties and privacy in relation to protest activity 
(Craven et al. 2015, p. 8).  
Not only was the New York Fusion Center found to be placing private interests ahead of 
public interests, but the Arizona Fusion Center also contacted private companies and 
organizations to inform them they were also potential targets of the protest. However, not only 
were Arizona agents found supplying information to the private sector, but they also sent an 
undercover police officer to further monitor and assess the “threat” of the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement (Craven et al. 2015, p. 8). The undercover officer posed as a homeless man that 
identified with anarchist movements in Mexico in order to gain knowledge about activists’ 
participating in the movement. The center also collected information on activist’s criminal 
records, their social security numbers, physical descriptions, ID numbers, home addresses, 
Facebook pages, and blogs. The data collected against the protestors demonstrates how fusion 
centers work with their local police departments to ‘one-stop-shop’ and aggregate personally 
18 
 
identifiable information. All of the information gathered was aggregated to a file titled, “Occupy 
Phoenix Social Media and Events Updates” (Craven et al. 2015, p. 8).  
The ability for federal, state, and private agencies to engage in surveillance against 
citizens not connected to terrorism is problematic for individual civil liberties. Currently, the 
courts have developed a “balancing of competing interests” measure which is supposed to 
interpret constitutional principles and statutes to decided whether police surveillance and search 
methods violates the privacy of the citizen. The courts typically use the balancing of competing 
interests measure when determining whether police should be allowed to use warrantless 
surveillance and search methods in order to promote public safety (Bloss, 2007 p. 212-13). 
Fusion centers in New York and Arizona used the balance of competing interests measure when 
justifying the use of police surveillance against Occupy protestors. 
According to Monahan and Regan (2012)20 the database fusion center analysts use are 
described to be “like Google,” except for the police. The types of data fusion centers can access 
include: welfare/unemployment checks, firearm licenses, car-rental information, credit reports, 
department of motor vehicle records/photos, employment histories, addresses, phone numbers, 
suspicious activity reports, booking information from police department and correctional 
agencies, as well as police investigation data. Fusion center analysts take advantage of “for-a-
fee” private sector databases (e.g. Entersect, LexisNexis’, Accurint, LocatePlus, etc.), which 
contain the personal data about individuals in and outside the United States (Monahan & Regan, 
2012 p. 305-6).  
Currently, it is questionable whether fusion centers are appropriately balancing civil 
liberties and public safety due to the creation of vague policies. The only legislative policy DHS 
                                                
20 Monahan, T. & Regan P.M. (2012). Zones of Opacity: Data Fusion in Post 9-11 Security Organizations. Canadian Journal of 
Law and Society. 27(3). See pages 308-9.  
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has in place for fusion centers protecting the data of citizen’s is Title 28 Part 23 of the Code of 
Regulations (CFR). CFR asserts that information being collected and retained must be 
reasonably suspicious in that the individual is involved in criminal conduct and the information 
being stored is relevant to such conduct (Monahan & Regan, 2012 p. 307). The vague wording 
of CFR was intentional, in that the storing of information is illegal. However, what remains legal 
is running quick data mining searches without reasonable suspicion because analysts are often 
not storing all information searched. Therefore, surveillance through data mining searches are 
not only being performed by federal, state, and private sector analysts but they are also being 
conducted without establishing probable cause first. The ability to run surveillance checks on 
citizens who have not committed a crime and are not being investigated for a crime, without 
having established probable cause, is not only unreasonable but before 9/11 was once considered 
illegal.  
In conclusion, it is important for research to be conducted on how citizens in the United 
States feel about the dataveillance abilities of government and private agencies, in order to better 
understand individual expectations of privacy in 2017. The following section will discuss 
research that has been previously conducted on societal opinion of surveillance and privacy 
including: the findings from research conducted on the intrusiveness of law enforcement 
searches, the findings from the 2006 GPD study, the findings from a 2014 follow up of the GPD 
study, and research conducted by Pew Research Center on surveillance, national security and 
privacy. 
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Research on Societal Opinion of Surveillance and Privacy 
With the goal of better understanding the intrusiveness of law enforcement searches, 
Slobogin and Schumacher (1993)21 conducted a study involving 76 jury members. Participants 
were asked to rate on a scale ranging from 1 to 100 (1 being the lowest and 100 being the 
highest) relative levels of intrusiveness of 25 scenarios involving investigative tactics conducted 
by law enforcement. The majority of scenarios involved law enforcement officials trying to 
obtain records defined by Slobogin as “transactional surveillance” (e.g. bank records, use of 
snoop ware, pharmacy records, emails, websites visited, phone records etc.) of target driven 
investigation and data mining investigations. Additional forms of transactional surveillance are 
displayed below and do not require the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, scenarios needing the 
Fourth Amendment included searches of bedrooms, searches of cars, pat downs/frisks, and 
roadblocks are italicized below. The results of the 1993 survey revealed that participants 
considered many types of transaction surveillance to be more intrusive than traditional searches 
needing the Fourth Amendment. See Table 1, below.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 Slobogin, C., & Schumacher, J. E. (1993). Reasonable expectations of privacy and autonomy in fourth amendment cases: An 
empirical look at "understandings recognized and permitted by society". Duke Law Journal, 42(4), 727-77. 
22 Table 1: Slobogin, 2008. Government data mining and the fourth amendment. The University of Chicago Law Review. 72(1) 
317-341. Note: Scenarios not involving transaction surveillance appear in italics. These findings are based on a survey 
administered to seventy-six members of the Gainesville, Florida jury pool, randomly selected from a list composed of all 
residents who have driver’s license or identification card. See Fla Stat. Ann ξ 40.011 West, 2007).  
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Table 1. Mean Intrusiveness Ratings of Twenty-five Scenarios 
 
Scenario 
 
Mean 
Confidence 
Interval 
1. Roadblock 30.2 ±7.5 
2. Airplane passenger list (event-driven) 32.4    8 
3. Store patron list (event-driven) 34.1 7.5 
4. Criminal/traffic records 36.2  7 
5. Anonymous phone, credit card and travel records (event-driven) 38.5 7 
6. Corporate records 40.6 7 
7. Real estate records 45.5 8 
8. Id check and questioning during brief stop 49.1 8 
9. Club membership records 49.5 8 
10. Phone records (event-driven) 50.0 8 
11. Electricity Records 57.5 8 
12. High school records 58.3 9 
13. Phone, credit card, and travel records (event-driven) 59.7 8 
14. Record of specific phone call 59.8 7.5 
15. List of food purchases 65.3 7.5 
16. Patdown 71.5 7.5 
17. Phone records 74.1 7.5 
18. Websites visited 74.4 8 
19. Search of car 74.6 7 
20. Credit card records 75.3 7.5 
21. Email addresses sent to and received from 77.1 8 
22. Pharmacy records 78.0 7.5 
23. Use of snoop ware to target subject 79.0 8 
24. Bank records 80.3 7.5 
25. Bedroom search 81.2 6.5 
 
 Due to Fourth Amendment requirements, pat downs and searches require law 
enforcement officials to establish probable cause or obtain a warrant. However, forms of 
transactional surveillance do not require either. The mean score for the twenty-five scenarios 
were recorded. The most intrusive activity reported by individuals sampled was searches of 
bedrooms, revealing a mean score of 81.2. The second most intrusive score was searches of bank 
records, revealing a mean score of 80.30. This reveals that forms of transactional surveillance, 
which are equivalent to data mining, were perceived to be more intrusive than pat downs or 
searches of cars. This finding is contrary to the Supreme Court ruling of Smith, which held that 
the transferring of information to third parties does not lessen the intrusiveness of government 
efforts to obtain personal information. The contradiction had between individuals understanding 
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of reasonableness compared to the Supreme Court’s understanding suggests that Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence ought to recognize society’s expectation of what information should 
be deemed as private (p. 336). 
Previous research conducted by The Surveillance Project at Queens University in 2006 
examined cross-national attitudes about surveillance, privacy, and experiences with the global 
flow of personal data.23 Referred to as The Globalization of Personal Data: An International 
Survey on Privacy and Surveillance, the study surveyed 9,600 respondents in nine countries 
(Canada, United States, Brazil, Mexico, China, Japan, France, Hungry, and Spain).  
The results of the GPD study revealed a little over half of U.S. citizens surveyed reported 
being “very knowledgeable” or “somewhat knowledgeable” about the laws protecting their 
personal information held by private agencies (51.7%) and government agencies (53.6%). 
Slightly over half of respondents believed that the laws were either “very effective” or 
“somewhat effective” in protecting their personal information in government departments 
(51.5%) and private departments (51.1%).  When asked about their trust that the government 
would do an appropriate job of protecting their personal data, only a handful of individuals 
reported having “very high” levels of trust. Respondents in China (54%) held the highest 
percentage for “reasonably high trust” in the government to protect their personal data compared 
to 29% of respondents in the United State, 26% in France, and 17% in Brazil (see Table 2).24 The 
cumulative percentage for trust in private companies increased in all countries except Japan in 
comparison to trust in government. (see Table 3) . 
                                                
23 Zureik, E. (2010). Surveillance, privacy, and the globalization of personal information: International comparisons McGill-
Queen's University Press. 
24 Table 2 and Table 3: The globalization of personal data project: an international project on privacy and surveillance. Summary 
of Findings (2008). Table 2 displays percentages from the survey question, “When it comes to the privacy of personal 
information what level of trust do you have that your government is striking the right balance between national security and 
individual rights? Table 3 displays percentages from the survey question, “What level of trust do you have that private companies 
such as banks credit card companies and places where you shop, will protect your personal information? 
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Table 2. Trust in Government 
 
 
Country 
Percentage of 
Reasonably High 
Levels of Trust 
Percentage of 
Very High 
Levels of Trust 
 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
China 53.9% 9.7% 63.6% 
Hungary 39.6% 11.4% 51.0% 
Canada 43.1% 4.9% 48.0% 
USA 28.6% 9.9% 38.5% 
Mexico 31.4% 3.8% 35.2% 
Spain  31.1% 3.3% 34.4% 
France 26.3% 3.6% 29.9% 
Brazil 17.7% 2.7% 20.4% 
Japan 13.4% N/A 13.4% 
 
Table 3. Trust in Private Companies 
 
 
Country 
Percentage of 
Reasonably High 
Levels of Trust 
Percentage of 
Very High 
Levels of Trust 
 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
China 57.1% 9.9% 67.1% 
Hungary 41.5% 14.7% 56.2% 
USA 43.5% 5.8% 49.3% 
Canada 42.5% 6.0% 48.5% 
Spain  37.2% 9.2% 46.4% 
France 36.6% 4.7% 41.2% 
Mexico 29.1% 7.8% 36.9% 
Japan 30.8% 1.4% 32.2% 
Brazil 18.1% 5.9% 24.0% 
 
Similarly, when respondents were asked questions regarding terrorism and security, about 
half of all citizens in 6 countries surveyed (except Hungry, China, and France) believed that laws 
aimed at protecting national security are intrusive upon their personal privacy. Specifically, 
within the United States over half respondents (57%) believed that laws aimed at protecting 
national security were either “highly intrusive” or “somewhat intrusive” upon their personal 
privacy, (see Table 4).25  
 
 
                                                
25 Table 4. The globalization of personal data project: an international project on privacy and surveillance. Summary of Findings 
(2008). Percentage of responses from the survey question, “The government has enacted laws aimed at protecting national 
security. To what extent do you believe laws aimed at protecting national security are intrusive upon personal privacy?” 
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Table 4. Intrusiveness of Security Laws 
 
 
Country 
 
Percentage of 
Highly Intrusive 
 
Percentage of 
Somewhat Intrusive 
 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
Japan 7.0% 56.6% 63.6% 
USA 15.1% 42.2% 57.3% 
Spain  9.6% 43.9% 53.5% 
Brazil 14.9% 36.4% 51.3% 
Mexico 6.7% 41.7% 48.4% 
Canada 10.2% 37.5% 47.7% 
Hungary 8.1% 32.5% 40.6% 
France 13.6% 26.7% 40.3% 
China 2.8% 22.9% 25.7% 
 
Slightly over a third of respondents (38.5%) trust that the government is balancing national 
security rights and individual rights appropriately. These statistics reveal that societal 
expectations of privacy are not being met in the United States. Overall, trust in the government to 
balance national security rights appropriately is low amongst citizens, these findings are 
important because this balancing is what current Supreme Court rulings are based on.  
In 2014, Smith and Lyon used data from the GPD project in 2006 and compared data 
from a follow-up survey collected in 2012. Instead of analyzing all nine countries featured in the 
2006 study, Smith and Lyon chose to only focus on the United States and Canada.  The goal of 
this research was to highlight the changes to societal opinion over time on surveillance and 
perception of control over personal data. The survey mainly focused on questions involving 
participant’s attitudes about their knowledge of surveillance technology as well as perceptions of 
privacy in certain circumstances (p. 191). 
  The results of the survey revealed that knowledge of surveillance technology remained 
high for certain types of surveillance (i.e. GPS). However, there was a decrease in reported 
knowledge of RFID chips, CCTV, biometrics, and data mining. Significantly more males than 
females were knowledgeable about surveillance technology. Only 17% of individuals sampled 
claimed to have knowledge of data mining and only 16% of the sample claimed to have 
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knowledge of biometrics. These findings suggest that knowledge of complex surveillance 
technology is uncommon in both the United States and Canada. These findings are important 
because government and private agencies use complex surveillance in order to access citizen’s 
personal data. With only a small percentage of individuals surveyed reporting being 
knowledgeable about the surveillance technology used to access their personal data, the majority 
of citizens are left not knowing exactly how government and private agencies use surveillance 
and what the consequences are for their individual privacy.  
In comparison to the 2006 study a large proportion of individuals in both the United 
States and Canada felt they had increased control over their personal information. Slightly over 
half of Americans (52%) felt they had “a lot of say,” in controlling their data compared to the 
37% of Americans who felt like they had “some say”. There was a decrease in the number of 
individuals that reported being “very knowledgeable” about laws dealing with the protection of 
personal data by private companies in the United States (52% in 2006 to 43% in 2012). There 
was also an increase in both the United States and Canada in the perception that government 
laws aimed at protecting national security are intrusive upon personal privacy. In the United 
States this figure increased from 57% in 2006 to 63% in 2012. In comparison to 2006, 
Americans were less supportive of their employers being able to read their emails, with only 
18% of respondents stating that it is the right of the employer to monitor emails. Lastly, 
responses remained the same, with over half of Americans stating that employers should not 
share information about their employees under any circumstances to third parties such as private 
sector agencies or government agencies.  
Additionally, in 2005 the New York Times reported that the Bush Administration 
authorized the NSA to eavesdrop on Americans. Pew asked Americans how they felt about this 
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authorization of surveillance and their research revealed that 50% of Americans still thought the 
government had not done enough in terms of curbing terrorism and 54% said it was generally 
right for the government to be monitoring the telephone and email communications of 
individuals suspected of having ties to terrorists without a court order. The same results were 
found in a survey conducted in 2009 during Obama’s time in office. However, over half of 
Americans (52%) expressed concern about government agencies’ surveillance capabilities in 
regards to data and electronic communications.   
Comparing these academic findings to other reports on opinions associated with 
surveillance is important. Pew Research has conducted numerous studies investigating the 
debates between civil liberties and anti-terrorism policies. For example, in 2016, Pew Research 
investigated the attitudes of Americans regarding privacy and security. Their research looked at 
the current divide that exists between the need for security and the need for personal privacy and 
found that, during high profile cases related to privacy vs. security, a majority of American 
adults favored a “security first” approach but that violations and sacrifices of civil liberties 
should be avoided.  In December of 2015, Pew found that 56% of Americans were more 
concerned that the government’s anti-terrorism policies had not gone far enough to protect the 
country. In contrast, only 28% of American surveyed expressed that the government had gone 
too far in restricting the average person’s civil liberties.26 These findings suggest that over time, 
half of Americans view surveillance being conducted with a court order as an acceptable 
practice, but are also expressing increased concern over the surveillance capabilities of 
government agencies.  
                                                
26 Rainie, L., and Maniam, S. (2016). Americans feel tensions between privacy and security concerns. Retrieved from: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensions-between-privacy-and-security-concerns/ 
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In regards to private and corporate agencies’ data mining capabilities, Americans are 
becoming increasingly more concerned (Rainie & Maniam, 2016, p. 4). Specifically, Pew reports 
that Americans feel that they have lost control over their personal data and are becoming more 
aware of the amount of information being collected upon them by private companies (Pew, 
2016). Many Americans struggle to understand the nature and scope of data being collected 
about them. Ninety-one percent (91%) of adults “agree “or “strongly agree” that consumers have 
lost control of how personal information is collected and used by companies. A majority of those 
surveyed in the United States believe changes in laws could make a difference in protecting 
privacy, especially when it comes to policies on retention of their data. Americans are 
acknowledging that big data breeches at private companies (e.g. Target, Wells Fargo, Yahoo 
etc.) is concerning. Many Americans state that they are not confident that the information being 
collected and retained by private companies is secure (Rainie & Maniam, 2016, p. 4-6).  
Overall, Pew’s research (2001, 2002, 2006, 2011, 2015, 2016) reveals that societal 
attitudes related to privacy and security are divided. Fifty-two percent (52%) describe themselves 
as being “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” about government surveillance. The public 
generally believes that it is “acceptable” for the government to monitor “others” including 
foreign citizens, foreign leaders and American leaders. However, fifty-seven percent (57%) of 
those surveyed stated that it is “unacceptable” for the government to monitor all communications 
of U.S. citizens. Many Americans struggle to understand the nature and scope of data being 
collected about them by government and private agencies. Findings from these Pew research 
reports suggests a decline in Americans favoring the government being able to monitor them 
28 
 
through a range of data sources (i.e. credit card purchases, phone calls, and emails) but agree that 
surveillance is an important tool in order to combat terrorism. (See Figure 4) 27 
Table 5. Civil Liberties and Anti-Terrorism Policies 
Percent who favor each as a measure to 
curb terrorism 
Sept  
2001 
% 
Aug  
2002 
% 
Dec 
2006 
% 
Aug 
2011 
% 
Requiring that all citizens carry a national 
ID card at all times 
70 59 57 57 
Extra airport checks on passengers who 
appear to be of Middle Eastern Descent 
-- 59 57 53 
Government monitoring credit card 
purchases 
-- 43 42 42 
Government monitoring personal phone 
calls and emails 
-- 33 34 29 
 
This review of previous research explains how the authorization of the Patriot Act, the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and the creation of fusion centers have 
changed individual expectations to privacy. Specifically, these changes have led to the absence 
of defined legislative policies for illegal uses of surveillance for federal, local, and private 
agencies and to issues with Supreme Court rulings failing to incorporate societal norms and 
values when deciding if an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in cases involving 
technology. In addition, previous research suggests that over half of citizens in the United States 
believe that such legislative changes are intrusive to individual privacy and do not support the 
monitoring of communications of all citizens in the United States (Zureick, 2010; Pew, 2016). 
Thus, future legislation should address these concerns as well as do a better job balancing 
individual civil liberties and national security interests 
The following chapter will introduce theoretical perspectives on surveillance and privacy, 
articulating how these theoretical perspectives relate to the current study. Specifically, this 
                                                
27 Doherty, C. (2013) Balancing act: national security and civil liberties in post 9/11 era. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/balancing-act-national-security-and-civil-liberties-in-post-911-era/ 
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section will explore how surveillance has historically been designed to discipline and control 
citizens panoptically through both economic and political influences. Additionally, this section 
will also evaluate theoretical perspectives on privacy, which will increase understanding of how 
citizens calculate privacy concerns as well as how to determine privacy expectations for personal 
data stored within private agencies.   
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CHAPTER 4 
REVIEW OF THEORY RELATED TO CURRENT STUDY 
Theoretical Perspectives on Surveillance 
The accelerated diffusion of information and communication technology (ICT) in social, 
economic, and political life over the past two decades has led to scholars examining the impact 
of surveillance and its affects on individual privacy (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2014). The rise of 
surveillance in government and private agencies has increased the visibility of citizens as well as 
their personal information. The acquiring of information on citizens and consumers has been 
dubbed useful for private and government agencies, however understanding how individuals feel 
about this process is complicated. The following sections of this chapter will discuss theoretical 
underpinnings on surveillance and privacy in order to better understand how the ubiquitousness 
of surveillance in government and private agencies influences individual privacy concerns.  
Understanding Surveillance After 9-11 
 Over the past twenty years the growth of surveillance can be attributed to new 
information technologies. According to Lyon et al. (2014), new information technologies, which 
are relatively inexpensive and easy to oversee, allow for the monitoring of more individuals than 
ever thought possible (p. 2). Specifically, computers have the power to handle huge data sets 
(i.e., “big data”), and both private and government agencies have taken advantage of information 
systems to collect and process the data of citizens. For example, private agencies use data to 
track consumer preferences and government agencies use data to track the behavior of citizens in 
order to predict and prevent crime (Dinev, Hart, & Mullen, 2008 p. 214). 
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Since 2002, policy initiatives28 have allowed for the exchange data between government 
and private agencies, enhancing the surveillance capabilities of the government. Koskela (2011)29 
argues that this blurred relationship between the private and public sector extends to the digital 
realm. Referred to as ‘wikiveillance,’ which is the monitoring of Internet feeds, technology 
advancements have allowed for the creation of virtual surveillance and have, in turn, created 
increased opportunities for visibility.  
Through technology advancements and the digitalization of personal information citizens 
are currently more visible digitally than physically. Haggerty, Lyon, and Ball (2014) suggest that 
as citizens have become more visible, surveillance has become more invisible. They argue that 
after 9/11 the ‘surveillance industrial complex’ was created by government and private agencies, 
which argued for surveillance as a solution for security and safety in order to combat terrorism 
(p. 6). Due to the invisibility of personal data and the sharing of data between public and private 
sectors, Zedner (2007)30 suggests that society is shifting from a post to a pre-crime society. 
Described earlier in the introduction by Professor Elizabeth Joh, a pre-crime society (i.e. 
predictive policing) uses calculations of risk, precaution, uncertainty and surveillance in order to 
anticipate and prevent crime. The transformation of surveillance over the past two decades has 
led to the creation of surveillance studies, which will be discussed in the following section.  
Panoptic and Non-Panoptic Theories of Surveillance 
The study of surveillance is a relatively new discipline within academia. Surveillance 
studies combines scholars from multiple disciplines across the social sciences, creating an 
                                                
28 The Cyber-Security Enhancement Act (CSEA) of 2002, allowed government agencies the ability to obtain emails, voice mails, 
phone records, and web-based transactions from the private sector. Additionally, the U.S. government also subpoenaed data from 
Google and other search engines (Hafner and Richetel, 2006; Walker, 2006).  
29 Koskela, Hille (2011). Hijackers and humble servants: individuals as camwitnesses in contemporary control work. Theoretical 
Criminology, 15(3): 269-82.  
30 Zedner, L (2007). Pre-crime and post-criminology? Theoretical Criminology: An International Journal 11(2): 261-281.  
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interdisciplinary approach to both the understanding and conceptualization of surveillance 
studies. Surveillance can be described as an ancient social process, seen in both institutional 
routines and human sociality (Locke, 2010).31 Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon is considered to be 
a symbolic example of architectural surveillance that was designed for discipline and control 
(Foucault, 1977).32 The panopticon was one of the very first forms of surveillance and was used 
observe, discipline, and monitor prisoners. It is an architectural figure of modern disciplinary 
power in which those in power have the ability to see all surrounding individuals at the same 
time, but those individuals are unable to see them. This is referred to as, “seeing without being 
seen,” which creates self-regulation and control of those being watched. Bentham’s panopticon is 
one of the very first examples of surveillance, and is a founding theoretical framework within 
surveillance studies and is still useful today.  
According to Thomas Allmer,33 two distinctive foundations of surveillance theories 
exists: panoptic theories of surveillance and non-panoptic theories of surveillance. Panoptic 
theories of surveillance focus on power being centralized and society being controlled through 
surveillance by coercion, repression, discipline, and domination. In contrast, non-panoptic 
theories of surveillance describe surveillance as a plural technical natural process in which there 
are constraining and enabling effects of the collection of data, but everyone has equal 
opportunity to be ‘surveyed’ (p. 579). Non-panoptic theories argue that surveillance is an 
administrative organization of modernity for information gathering, in which surveillance is used 
as a tool to supervise societies, not to “spy” on citizens (Dandeker, 1990 p. 7).  
Suspect Subjects 
                                                
31 Locke, John (2010). Eavesdropping: An Intimate History, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
32 Foucault, M (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books.  
33 Allmer, Thomas (2011) Critical surveillance studies in the information of society. TripleC 9(2): 566-592. 
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Henne and Troshynski (2013) suggest that the growth of surveillance technologies has 
allowed policymakers to expand the types of activities that can be deemed suspicious (p. 109). 
Specifically, they argue that the ability for government and private agencies to anticipate “risk” 
based on information and communication technologies has led to diminished levels of individual 
privacy. Similarly, Bennett, Haggerty, Lyon, and Steeves (2014) suggest that surveillance is 
more than tracking criminals. Rather, it is a way of classifying individuals based on their 
available data, stating that, “Yesterday’s target was a person; today’s target is a profile” (p. 6).  
Since the passing of the Patriot Act and the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security, government and private agencies have insisted that surveillance against citizens is 
distributed evenly amongst all societal members. However, Koskela (2012) argues that a 
considerable body of research has demonstrated that surveillance is used most often to monitor a 
similar assortment of ‘suspicious’ groups (e.g. youths, political activists, people of color, etc.). 
For example, since 2002 the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has engaged in the 
religious profiling and surveillance of Muslims.34 Similarly, NYPD was also found using 
surveillance technology in order to infiltrate individuals within the Black Lives Matter 
movement.35 If surveillance were simply an “administrative organization of modernity” then the 
inequitable treatment of different groups would not exist. Thus, it is important for this research to 
evaluate individuals of different socio-demographic backgrounds in order to fully understand 
how individuals perceive surveillance and privacy.  
Traditional forms of surveillance (e.g. the panopticon) were used to discipline, monitor, 
and control inmates through visible architectural designs. In contrast, less visible forms of 
surveillance technologies (e.g. data mining) have expanded the ability for those in power (i.e. 
                                                
34 See: https://www.aclu.org/other/factsheet-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program  
35 See: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/04/nypd-police-black-lives-matter-surveillance-undercover  
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government and private agencies) and, in control over surveillance systems, to determine and 
sort individuals based on risk. The ability for government and private agencies to deploy 
surveillance technologies against some individuals in society more than others suggests that 
surveillance is not conducted neutrally (Allmer, 2015). Thus, this research argues in support for 
panoptic theories of surveillance since surveillance is not being performed evenly against all 
individual within society. Specifically, the theoretical goal of this research is to establish a 
dialogue discussing how diverse individuals perceive the surveillance capabilities of government 
and private agencies, investigating whether differences in support or concern of surveillance can 
be attributed to differences in the demographic characteristics of respondents.  
Theoretical Perspectives on Privacy 
The Privacy Calculus Model 
 According to Culnan and Armstrong (1999) the theoretical concept of a “privacy 
calculus” was introduced by information systems studies in order to understand competing 
factors that might cause an individual to provide information in a given situation. Currently, 
within academia, researchers are also using the privacy calculus approach in order to understand 
how individuals perceive government surveillance by evaluating differences in individual 
privacy constructs (Dinev et al., 2008, p. 216). Specifically, this is being accomplished by 
evaluating individual experiences with privacy, their awareness of privacy, differences in 
personality and socio-demographics, and an assessment of current culture/climate in order to 
understand how individuals calculate whether they are concerned or unconcerned about privacy 
(Smith et al. 2011, p. 998).  
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 The relationship between privacy and other constructs is currently not a grounded 
theoretical framework36. However, it is useful when thinking about how privacy concerns can 
form because of an individual’s socio-economic, political, previous experienced, and personal 
characteristics (Smith, 2011). For example, in regards to privacy experiences, Smith et al. (1996) 
discovered that individuals who had been a victim of personal information abuses had stronger 
concerns regarding information privacy. Similarly, it was also discovered that individuals that 
are aware of organizations that have used or collected their data without their permission tend to 
be more concerned about their privacy (Cespedes & Smith, 1993). Additionally, various studies 
have investigated how demographic differences can affect privacy concerns. The findings of 
those studies reveal that women are typically more concerned than men, and individuals that are 
less educated, poor, or African American-identified are also less concerned about privacy (Chen 
& Rea 2004; Culnan & Armstrong 1999; Sheehan 1999).  
 In addition to individual characteristics being important to evaluate, consequentialism is 
also an important factor when determining privacy concerns. Specifically, this means that when 
consumers are requested to provide personal information, they typically perform a “risk-benefit” 
analysis (Smith, 2011, p. 1001). For example, privacy risk is defined as the degree to which an 
individual believes there is a high potential for loss associated with the release of their personal 
information. Previous research has identified that when agencies (public or private) engage in 
organizational opportunistic behavior, which can include selling personal data or sharing 
personal data to third parties or government agencies, this type of behavior can cause negative 
emotions, thus impacting the disclosure of personal information (Malhotra et al. 2004; Smith et 
                                                
36 Grounded theoretical approaches can be described as an approach in qualitative research that uses a systematic se of 
procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
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al, 1996). Essentially, this means that individuals calculate whether the actions of the public or 
private agency is either wrong or right, and this influences their privacy concerns.  
Understanding how individuals conceptualize privacy concerns is important for this 
research. Specifically, this research utilizes the privacy calculus perspective by evaluating 
individuals of diverse socio-demographic backgrounds and asking them about their awareness 
and knowledge of surveillance technology and the effectiveness of privacy laws. Through the 
assessment of a diverse number of independent variables (i.e. demographics, effectiveness of 
laws, and knowledge of surveillance technology and laws), this research will better be able to 
understand the underlying reasons why individuals are supportive/un-supportive, trusting/un-
trusting and accepting/un-accepting of the surveillance abilities of government and private 
agencies. 
The Social Network Theory of Privacy  
 What facts are public facts and what facts are private facts? According to Professor Lior 
Strahilevtiz, (University of Chicago School of Law), the law’s approach to privacy should derive 
primarily from empirical investigation of social norms. Strahilevitz (2005) argues that the United 
States’ court system is lacking in a coherent, consistent methodology for determining whether an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy when a fact that has been shared with one or 
more person. Since the courts have not consistently applied privacy expectations, Strahilevitz 
developed a “Social Network Theory of Privacy” (2005), which suggests that social networks 
and information dissemination can help provide courts with a coherent and consistent 
methodology for determining privacy expectations.     
 Using theoretical and empirical insights about the probability of certain information 
disclosed to one member of community to be passed along to a large segment of a community, 
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courts could gauge whether the plaintiff’s previously private information would have been 
disseminated regardless of the defendant’s actions. If the information would have disseminated 
regardless of the defendant’s action then the information should be classified as public. But, if 
not, tort law should deem the information as private. It is important for the courts to have a 
distinction between information that is considered public and information that is considered 
private due to advancements of surveillance technology increasing the visibility of personal data 
within government and private agencies.  
Slobogin (2008) used Strahilevitz’s Social Network Theory of Privacy to explain data 
mining stating: 
“Unless it is part of a public record designed for consumption by everyone or described an activity 
observed by strangers, the transactional information government seeks through data mining is rarely known 
outside of our families, much less outside our social network (aside from third party-institutions to which 
we provide it). Expectations that such information will remain “private” are reasonable from the social 
network perspective.”37  
 
Slobogin ultimately argues that information citizens disclose to third private agencies (whether it 
be telephone carriers, banks, employers, etc.) should be recognized by the courts as private due 
to the improbability that the same information could be discovered by friends and family. The 
Social Network Theory of Privacy, when applied to this research, asserts that citizens’ opinions 
on private and government agencies’ surveillance capabilities are important for legislators and 
policy makers to take seriously. Specifically, the Social Network Theory of Privacy asserts that 
the courts should protect citizens from unwanted disclosure of their personal data.  
In conclusion, this chapter explored several important theoretical foundations that are 
critical to understanding surveillance and privacy. Panoptic theories of surveillance describe how 
those in power (i.e. government and private agencies) are able to “see” the personal information 
                                                
37 Slobogin, Christopher (2008) Government Data Mining and The Fourth Amendment. The University of Chicago 
Law Review, p. 333  
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of individuals within society without them knowing their information is being “seen,” describing 
the invisibility of surveillance. Additionally, these theories provide a valuable context to the 
understanding of how surveillance is conducted un-equitably by those in power in order to 
combat terrorism and all crimes. The Privacy Calculus Model is useful in understanding why it is 
important for this research to investigate individual’s awareness of surveillance technology and 
laws after 9/11, due to individuals calculating concern differently depending upon socio-
demographic differences and experiences. The Social Network Theory of Privacy provides 
theoretical insight on the need for the courts to recognize that expectations of privacy have 
changed as technology has advanced, including the need for transparency of surveillance being 
conducted by government and private agencies on the data of personal citizens. Overall, the 
incorporation of these theoretical foundations have guided the current study in hopes of better 
understanding how individuals of diverse socio-demographic backgrounds feel about their 
personal data being able to be seen (i.e. collected, stored, shared) by government and private 
agencies at all times.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Questions/Hypothesis 
The current study was designed to advance previous research by addressing three related 
questions about government and private agencies’ surveillance abilities. Specifically, this 
research asks: 1) Are there individual demographic differences between respondents in levels of 
acceptability, trust, and support of government and private agencies data sharing and data mining 
capabilities? 2) Does individual knowledge of surveillance technologies and laws influence 
levels of acceptability, trust, and support of government and private agencies’ surveillance 
capabilities? 3) Are individuals more concerned with government or private agencies’ 
surveillance abilities? By asking these questions, this research will increase societal 
understanding on citizens’ privacy expectations as well as describe how individuals in the United 
States feel about government and private agencies data sharing and data mining capabilities.  
As noted throughout, previous research has found that there is a growing decline in trust 
in government agencies’ ability to balance individual rights with national security rights and 
private companies to protect the personal data of citizens (Zureik, 2010). In recent years, law 
enforcement agencies and fusion centers have been caught using surveillance technology not just 
in cases involving terrorism, but also in all crimes (Monahan, 2010). The issue with law 
enforcement agencies’ use of surveillance is that it is not done equitably across socio-
demographic groups.  
Although previous research has stated that African Americans are less concerned about 
privacy in comparison to other demographic groups, this research hypothesizes the opposite. 
Specifically, because surveillance is most often used to monitor a similar assortment of 
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“suspicious” groups (e.g. youths, political activists, people of color), it is predicted that this 
research will find significant differences across socio-demographic characteristics in their levels 
of trust and support for government and private agencies’ surveillance abilities. Furthermore, it is 
hypothesized in comparison to whites, individuals within the four other racial stratums (i.e. 
Hispanics, Blacks, Asians, and Two or More Races) will be less accepting, supportive and 
trusting in government private agencies. These differences are also expected amongst gender and 
economic markers. Specifically, individuals that are female identified are hypothesized to be 
more concerned about privacy as previous research has demonstrated (Chen and Rea, 2004; 
Armstrong 1999; and Sheehan, 1999) Additionally, individuals that make below $50,000 per 
year are also expected to be more concerned about privacy and surveillance than those that make 
above $50,000 per year.  
Similarly, previous theoretical perspectives suggest that the rise of surveillance 
infrastructures was created by government and private agencies as a solution to security and 
safety (Haggerty et al. 2014). As more information about individuals is collected via a range of 
surveillance capabilities, it is important to question privacy concerns. Drawing from previous 
research findings, only half of Americans (53%) are knowledgeable about the protection of 
personal information in government agencies, and only 43% are knowledgeable about the 
protection of personal information in private agencies (Chan et al., 2008; Smith & Lyon, 2014). 
Similarly, panoptic theories of surveillance suggest that societies are controlled through 
surveillance by being coerced and disciplined to accept the use of surveillance technology and to 
self-regulate accordingly. Currently, citizens unknowingly substitute their civil liberties due to 
being disciplined after terrorist attacks that increasing surveillance will make society safer and 
more secure. This is due to citizens not being informed on how increasing surveillance and 
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changing legislation affects their individual privacy. Therefore, this research expects to find that 
respondents will not be very knowledgeable about advanced surveillance technologies as well as 
laws and agencies created after 9/11. Perhaps, this unknowing could be due to a disciplining (i.e. 
normalizing of surveillance capabilities) and controlling (i.e. feelings about accepting and not 
questioning the Patriot Act) via invasive surveillance practices used in order to ensure safety and 
security.  
Drawing from Strahilevitz’s Social Network Theory of Privacy, which suggests that the 
data government and private agencies often obtain from third parties (i.e. telephone carriers or 
banks), this research expects to witness a decline in acceptability of government and private 
agencies’ data sharing abilities. Previous research has found that there is a growing decline in the 
percentage of Americans favoring government agencies ability to monitor their data as well as a 
loss of control over the data private agencies are able to collect on them (Pew, 2016). 
Specifically, this research expects to find respondents to be less supportive of private agencies 
data sharing and data mining abilities when compared to government agencies. This research 
expects lower acceptability and support for data sharing and data mining for private agencies due 
to expectations that their private information stored in these agencies should remain private. In 
comparison, this research expects respondents to be slightly more supportive of data sharing and 
data mining by government agencies due to such information being used to aide law enforcement 
investigations. Overall, this research expects to find lower levels of support and acceptability of 
data mining and data sharing when compared to previous research because of the declining levels 
of support for surveillance practices in both government and private agencies.  
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Sampling Design 
The unit of analysis being investigated in this study is the individual. The population of 
interest or the target population is all individuals over the age of 18 currently living in the United 
States. A non-probability sampling design was used to recruit participants for the online survey. 
Specifically, the survey platform Qualtrics recruited participants from twenty online 
sample panels. All study participants were considered ‘opt-in’ participants who were paid a 
minimal compensation for their completion of the survey.38 The actual population for this 
research was individuals from the twenty online sampling panels that were over the age of 18 
and were willing to define their race/ethnicity.  
This research utilized non-probability quota sampling methods in order to sub-divide the 
actual population into five different racial stratums. The benefits of non-probability sampling 
methods include the ability to better access hard to reach populations and to viably engage in 
specific case selection. The benefit of quota sampling is that it is a form of purposive sampling, 
which is typically used to select a single unit or population that is of importance.39 Due to quotas 
not being able to be withdrawn from Qualtrics randomly, quota sampling was chosen over 
simplified random sampling in order to ensure that the sample would be representative of 
important characteristics (i.e. races that have been under sampled in previous survey research). 
Specifically, respondents were divided into five different racial stratums (e.g. 104 White-Non-
Hispanic, 104 African American, 104 Hispanic, 104 Asian/Pacific Islander, and 104 Two or 
More Races/Other) totaling 521 respondents. 
                                                
38 Qualtrics charges $4.00 per completed response, meaning that for 521 responses the total cost of the survey was approximately 
$2,000. The additional 21 responses were extra, provided by Qualtrics for no additional charge. 
39 Singleton, R., and Straits, B. C. (2005). Approaches to social research, Oxford University Press. 
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Through the application of non-probability sampling methods, this research is able to 
explore whether demographic differences exist between respondents. Although non-probability 
sampling methods lack the ability to be generalized and cannot control for investigator bias, the 
use of these methods is necessary in order to explore hard to reach populations. The individuals 
sampled in this research cannot be considered an accurate representation of all individuals in the 
United States over the age of 18 because this research was only able to target individuals through 
Qualtrics. Specifically, missing from this research are individuals that do not partake in online 
surveys or do not have access Internet access. Despite the limitations of the sampling methods 
described, this research will help formulate a better understanding of support, trust, and 
acceptability of data sharing and data mining by government and private agencies and how 
individuals can differ based on socio-demographic characteristics.  
How Qualtrics Recruits: Benefits and Limitations 
Previous research conducted by Heen, Lieberman, and Miethe (2014), explored the 
benefits and limitations of survey platforms. Specifically, their research focused on Qualtrics, 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, and Survey Monkey. Some of the difficulties when working with 
Qualtrics is figuring out exactly how they assemble their sampling panels. Heen et al. (2014) 
found that Qualtrics outsources the process of recruiting participants to other firms. In 
comparison, Survey Monkey creates a panel of eligible respondents by contacting individuals 
who previously completed an electronic service. Mechanical Turk uses their labor workforce as a 
basis for their sampling frames, which are composed of workforce pools of more than 500,000 
respondents from either the United States or India.  
The reasoning for choosing Qualtrics over other survey platforms can be attributed to the 
quality of their platform’s data. All of Qualtrics panels are referred to as “double opt in” which 
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means that recruited respondents have gone through a rigorous screening process ensuring that 
they do in fact meet the criteria needed for the specific panel. Additionally, recruited respondents 
have taken surveys previously therefore their demographic information is typically on file. The 
advantage to having respondents’ demographic information on file is that if panelists do not 
answer demographic questions accordingly to their previously established identity they will be 
removed and replaced. 40  
Although Qualtrics is more expensive than Mechanical Turk, they are able to ensure that 
an actual person is taking the survey and also that the person is taking the survey seriously and 
not just speeding through the questions. For example, Qualtrics offers a soft launch in order to 
test the average time it should take to complete the survey. If respondents proceed too quickly 
they will be removed from the survey and replaced with a different respondent, ensuring the 
quality of recruited respondents.  
The difficulty with using other survey platforms, like Mechanical Turk, aligns with an 
inability for the researcher to rigorously screen participants. For example, Mechanical Turk is 
excellent at screening individuals based on certain qualifications (e.g. income, employment 
status, marital status, education, political affiliation etc.). However, Mechanical Turk is unable to 
confirm that individuals are who they say they are. Additionally, Mechanical Turk typically 
produces samples that are predominately white and are less able to accurately stratify 
respondents based on race.41 Another potential issue with Mechanical Turk is that incentives to 
complete surveys are low. For example, people take surveys for as low as five cents. Therefore, 
                                                
40 The project manager from Qualtrics described situation where panelists did not answer their demographic information 
accurately in order to gain access to the survey and they were immediately removed from the sample and replaced with a new 
panelist.  
41 I personally reached out to Mechanical Turk to ask them if it was possible to stratify by race, in which they responded that it 
was possible but they could not guarantee that individuals were who they claimed to be. Mechanical Turk has panels designed for 
different socio-demographic characteristics, however they do not currently have panels that are stratified by race.  
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due to the limitations of other survey platforms Qualtrics was ultimately chosen because of the 
quality of their sampling panels and the assurance that recruited respondents will be 
representative of the five explicit racial stratums for this research.  
Research Design 
The close-ended survey questionnaire was developed by Queens University. Prior to the 
development of the questionnaire, researchers from the GPD project put together two qualitative 
focus groups in Chicago during July of 2004 in order to gain additional insight on how 
Americans perceive privacy issues. The focus groups consisted of 20 participants who were 
monetarily compensated for their time. The main findings of the focus group were that most 
participants felt that personal privacy was being eroded. Many participants blamed technology as 
well as 9/11 for reduced levels of privacy. In comparison to other countries, respondents had a 
strong belief that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights provides Americans with certain rights 
(i.e. right to privacy). Overall, participants felt that their privacy was being threatened by the 
government and private sector agencies due to the post 9/11 socio-political climate. The 
information obtained during the qualitative focus groups was used to develop the closed-ended 
questionnaire, which was replicated for this research.  
The cross sectional survey was developed and distributed over a one-week period in 
March 2017. The survey instrument was designed to collect descriptive data (i.e. characteristics, 
attitudes, and experiences) about citizens in the United States. The survey consisted of 35 closed 
ended (i.e. Likert Scale) questions measuring the following: 1) Demographics (race, gender, age, 
education, religion and income), 2) Knowledge of types of surveillance technology, 3) 
Effectiveness of government and private agencies privacy laws, 4) Effectiveness of the Fourth 
Amendment, 5) Knowledge of laws and departments created after 9/11, 6) Trust in government 
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and private agencies ability to guard personal information, 7) Intrusiveness of laws passed after 
9/11, 8) Acceptability of private and government agencies to share citizen’s personal information 
with third parties, 9) Support for government and private agencies ability to use ‘data mining’ 
tactics against citizens, and 10) Control over personal information.42  
Measurement 
 The independent variables represent socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. A 
wide range of socio-demographic characteristics was evaluated in order to assess if differences 
between demographic groups existed. Specifically, these characteristics included respondent’s 
race, gender, age, education, religion, and household income.43 Additionally, knowledge of 
surveillance technology and laws, effectiveness of privacy laws, and intrusiveness of national 
security laws, were also evaluated in order to examine the relationship between respondent’s 
support, trust, and acceptability of surveillance practices. Specific information about the 
independent variables is summarized below.  
Knowledge of Surveillance Technology and Laws 
 Respondents were asked about their levels of knowledge of the internet, global 
positioning systems (GPS), radio frequency identification (RFID) tags on consumer products, 
closed circuit television (CCTV) in public spaces, biometrics for facial recognition, and data 
mining of personal information. Similarly, respondents were asked about their level of 
knowledge of laws and agencies created after 9/11 (i.e. Department of Homeland Security, 
Fusion Centers, and the USA Patriot Act). Due to this research focusing on laws and agencies 
created after 9/11, it was important to create a new survey question that focuses on such changes. 
                                                
42 See Appendix for entire questionnaire.  
43 All of the socio-demographic variables were dummy coded. For example, age was dummy coded into respondents older than 
34 and respondents younger than 34, having a religion or not having a religion, earning more than $50,000 or earning below 
$50,000 dollars etc.  
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Previous research was not solely focused on the United States, therefore did not discuss specific 
legislation changes and the creation of new department and agencies. Responses were coded: 1) 
very knowledgeable, 2) somewhat knowledgeable, 3) not knowledgeable, and 4) not at all 
knowledgeable. Responses were coded the same for knowledge of surveillance technology and 
knowledge of legislation and agencies created after 9/11.  
Effectiveness of Privacy Laws 
In addition to creating a question on knowledge of laws and agencies created after 9/11, it 
was also important to ask respondents about whether they believed that the current laws 
government and private agencies were effective at protecting their personal privacy. Specifically, 
respondents were asked about the effectiveness of government and private agencies laws. 
Additionally, respondents were also asked about the effectiveness of the Fourth Amendment in 
protecting citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.  The creation of this question was 
important for this research in order to understand how knowledgeable and aware citizens were 
about their constitutional rights, but also the effectiveness of the amendment. Respondents were 
screened into this question by asking if they knew what the Fourth Amendment was. If they 
responded ‘no’ then they were not asked about the effectiveness of the Fourth Amendment. 
Responses were coded: 1) very effective, 2) somewhat effective, 3) not very effective, and 4) not 
at all effective. Coding for the effectiveness of laws in government and private agencies was the 
same as the coding for the effectiveness of the Fourth Amendment.  
Intrusiveness of National Security Laws  
In order to evaluate respondents’ opinions on the intrusiveness of laws established after 
9/11, respondents were asked whether they felt that national security laws were: 1) highly 
intrusive, 2) somewhat intrusive, 3) not very intrusive, 4) not very intrusive at all, and 5) not very 
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intrusive at all. Specifically, this question states, “The United States government has enacted 
laws aimed at protecting national security. To what extent do you believe the laws aimed at 
protecting national security are intrusive upon personal privacy?” 
Composite Measures  
 Three composite measures were created in order to determine the average score for 
knowledge of surveillance technology, knowledge of laws and agencies after 9/11, and the 
effectiveness of privacy laws. Specifically, one composite measure was developed from the 
respondent’s average knowledge of surveillance technology (e.g. CCTV, biometrics, data 
mining, etc.) Empirical support for combining items was found by computing the average inter-
item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of internal consistency. The observed 
Cronbach’s alpha was .844, strongly supporting the use of this composite measure across all six 
items.  
 Additionally, a second composite measure was created for knowledge of surveillance 
laws and agencies after 9/11. The composite measure was created by calculating the average 
knowledge of law in 1) government departments and 2) private companies, as well as 
respondents’ acknowledgement of 3) the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 4) 
the creation of Fusion Centers, and 5) the passing of the USA Patriot Act. The observed 
Cronbach’s alpha score for knowledge of surveillance laws and agencies was .840. A third 
composite measure was created for the effectiveness of privacy laws, combining the scores for 
the protection of personal information for laws by 1) private companies, 2) government 
departments, and effectiveness of 3) the Fourth Amendment. The observed Cronbach’s alpha 
score for effectiveness of privacy laws was .787, indicating high levels of internal consistency 
across the three composite measures. By averaging responses of survey questions, this research 
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able to better understand how 1) knowledge of surveillance technology, 2) knowledge of 
agencies created after 9/11, and 3) the effectiveness of privacy laws can influence the dependent 
variables in terms of support, trust, and acceptability for government and private agencies’ 
surveillance capabilities.  
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables for this research included support, trust, and acceptability of 
government and private agencies’ data sharing and data mining abilities. These dependent 
variables were chosen in order to evaluate how supportive or unsupportive citizens are about 
government and private agencies ability to use surveillance to share and obtain personal 
information about individuals in society. Additionally, this research was interested in knowing 
how much individuals trust government and private agencies’ in terms of their ability to protect 
their personal privacy. Specifically, six dependent variables were created in order to assess 
support, trust, and acceptability of government and private agencies’ surveillance capabilities.  
Support for Government and Private Agencies Dataveillance Abilities 
In order to assess support for surveillance, this research asked a series of questions to 
respondents. This research was interested in the level of support for government and private 
agencies ability to access citizen’s personal data (i.e. text messages, internet searches, websites, 
social media, credit card purchases, and location). Responses were coded the same for 
government and private agencies as: 1) support strongly, 2) support moderately, 3) oppose 
moderately, and 4) oppose strongly.  
Acceptability for Data Sharing: Government Agencies to Third Parties 
In order to assess the acceptability of government agencies ability to share personal data 
of citizens with third parties, respondents were asked circumstances in which it was either 
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acceptable or unacceptable for government agencies to share their personal information with 
third parties (i.e., national government, other private sector organizations, and foreign 
governments). Responses were coded as: 1) yes, it is the government’s right under all 
circumstances, 2) yes, if the citizen is suspected of wrong-doing, 3) yes, as long as the 
government has expressed the consent of the citizen, 4) no, under no circumstances should the 
government share information about citizens, and 5) not sure.  
Acceptability for Data Sharing: Private Agencies to Third Parties 
This research was also interested in knowing how acceptable it was for private agencies 
to share citizen’s personal information to third parties (i.e., other government agencies, foreign 
governments, and other private sectors). Responses were coded as: 1) yes, it is the organization’s 
right under all circumstances, 2) yes, if the customer is suspected of wrong-doing, 3) yes, as long 
as the organization has expressed the consent of the customer, 4) no, under no circumstances 
should organizations share information about their customers, and 5) not sure. Additionally, 
respondents were also asked about the acceptability of private companies to create profiles on 
their consumer habits in order better inform citizens on products they might potentially be 
interested in. Responses were coded as: 1) very acceptable, 2) somewhat acceptable, 3) not really 
acceptable, 4) not acceptable at all, and 5) not sure.  
Trust in Government and Private Agencies   
  In order to assess trust, respondents were asked how much trust they have that the 
government is striking the right balance between individual rights and national security. 
Respondents were also asked how much they trust private companies to protect their personal 
information. Responses were coded as: 1) very high levels of trust, 2) reasonably high levels of 
trust, 3) fairly low levels of trust, and 4) very low levels of trust. 
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Composite Measures  
 Four of the six dependent variables were constructed through the creation of composite 
variables. Specifically, composite variables were created in order to combine different questions 
throughout the survey that were measuring the same concept.  
First, a composite measure for dataveillance support was developed from the 
respondent’s average support for police and intelligence agencies (i.e. government agencies) and 
companies’ (i.e. private agencies) ability to use data mining tactics in six areas: 1) Scan the text 
of your email messages for information on your interests, 2) Track the content of your internet 
searches, 3) Obtain information on your website visits, 4) Obtain information on the contents of 
your social media, 5) Track your credit card purchases, and 6) Track your whereabouts using the 
GPS signal from your phone. Empirical support for combining these six items together was 
found by computing the average inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of 
internal consistency. The observed value was .944 for government agencies and .950 for private 
agencies, thus strongly supporting the use of two different composite measures. 
 Composite measures were also created for acceptability of data sharing and trust in 
government and private agencies. Two composite measures were created for acceptability of data 
sharing by averaging respondent’s answers for the appropriateness for government and private 
agencies to share citizen’s personal information to third parties (i.e. other government agencies, 
foreign governments, and the private sector. A Cronbach’s alpha and score of .866 for 
government agencies and .900 private agencies indicates high levels of internal consistency 
among the items within each factor.  
Analyses 
52 
 
 A series of univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analyses were conducted in order to 
evaluate differences between socio-demographic groups on support, trust, and acceptability of 
government and private agencies’ data mining and data sharing abilities. Traditional statistical 
analyses (e.g. ANOVA and linear regression) were preformed to examine socio-demographic 
differences in addition to evaluating the strength and the importance of the independent 
variables. The results will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESULTS 
 Unlike previous research, the current study utilized several different types of analyses 
(i.e. bivariate analyses and multivariate analyses) in order to further investigate the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables. These analyses were used in order to examine 
socio-demographic differences in the level of support, trust, and acceptability of data sharing and 
data mining capabilities of government and private agencies. This chapter will summarize the 
results of these analyses beginning with a summary of descriptive statistics compared to previous 
research.44 
Univariate Analysis: 
Knowledge of Surveillance Technology and Laws  
The results of this research revealed that knowledge of surveillance technology remained 
high for certain types of surveillance capabilities (e.g. Internet, GPS, CCTV). When compared to 
Smith and Lyon’s study in 2014, the percent of respondents that reported being very 
knowledgeable about advanced surveillance technology stayed the same. For example, 17% of 
respondents reported being very knowledgeable about data mining and 16% of respondents 
reported being very knowledgeable about biometrics and radio frequency identification (RFID). 
These findings suggest that knowledge of complex surveillance technology has not increased in 
the last three years among individuals in the United States.  
Additionally, the percentage of respondents that reported being very knowledgeable 
about laws and agencies created after 9/11 was low. For example, only 16% of respondents 
reported being very knowledgeable about laws protecting personal information in government 
                                                
44 See Appendix for entire univariate descriptive statistics tables. 
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and private agencies. Similar percentages were found for knowledge of the Department of 
Homeland Security (22%), the USA Patriot Act (17%) and fusion centers (9%).  
Effectiveness of Privacy Laws  
 Respondents were asked about the effectiveness of privacy laws in government and 
private agencies. Specifically, respondents were asked about the extent to which they believed 
laws were effective at protecting their personal information. More than half of respondents 
believed that laws were either very effective or somewhat effective in both government (60%) 
and private agencies (56%). Respondents were also asked about the effectiveness of the Fourth 
Amendment to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Over half (66%) of 
respondents believed that the Fourth Amendment was either very effective (18%) or somewhat 
effective (48%).  
Acceptability of Data Sharing  
 When asked about the appropriateness of government and private agencies sharing 
personal data of citizens to third parties (i.e. other government agencies, foreign governments, 
the private sector, or the national government), respondents were divided. A small percentage 
(less than 15%) believed it was the governments’ right to share data under all circumstances. 
Over a third of respondents believed that the government should not share their personal data to 
foreign governments (35%) or to private sector agencies (36%). Similar percentages were 
reported when it came to private agencies sharing personal data to third parties. Specifically, a 
small percentage of respondents (less than 15%) believed it were the organization’s right to share 
the personal information under all circumstances. However, over one-third of respondents did 
not think it was acceptable to share data with other private sector organizations (36%) or foreign 
governments (43%).  
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Trust in Government and Private Agencies 
 Respondents were asked about the level of trust they have that the United States 
government is striking the right balance between national security and individual rights. 
Comparing these findings to the 2006 GPD project, responses have stayed the same. Specifically, 
10% of respondents reported having very high levels trust and 28% of respondents reported 
having reasonably high levels of trust. Respondents were also asked about their level of trust in 
private agencies to protect their personal information. When compared to the GPD project, 
responses were, again, very similar. Specifically, over 45% of respondents had very high or 
reasonably high levels of trust compared to 49% in 2006. However, respondents of this study 
reported higher levels of trust in private agencies 45% than government agencies 38%.  
Support for Government and Private Agencies Dataveillance Abilities 
 Respondents were asked to indicate whether they support or oppose companies or 
police/intelligence agencies’ ability to engage in data mining (e.g. read text/email messages, 
track the content of internet searches, credit card purchases, location, etc.). In terms of private 
agencies ability to engage in data mining, half of respondents (50%) were strongly opposed to all 
six of the data mining scenarios. In comparison, in terms of police or intelligence agencies ability 
to engage in data mining, one-third of respondent (30%) were strongly opposed to all six data 
mining scenarios. Similarly, for both private companies and police/intelligence agencies, 
respondents were most opposed to having their location tracked from GPS on their cellphone. 
Respondents were strongly opposed to this data mining ability by private companies at 57% and 
41% for police/intelligence agencies.  
Intrusiveness of Laws and Control Over Personal Information 
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 Respondents were asked about how intrusive laws aimed at protecting national security 
were to personal privacy. Over half of the sample (67%) believed that the laws were either 
highly intrusive or somewhat intrusive. The GPD project found similar findings in 2006 with 
57% of respondents believing that laws aimed at protecting national security were highly or 
somewhat intrusive to personal privacy. 
 Additionally, respondents were asked about the extent of control they have over their 
personal information. Slightly less than one-third (30%) of the sample stated that they had no 
control and 42% said they had some control. These findings suggest that, as technology 
continues to advance, the storing of personal data changes. In other words, as individuals store 
more of their personal data in online platforms, they imply having less control over their personal 
data. For example, in 2017 slightly less than 30% of respondents reported having a lot of control 
over their personal data. In comparison, in 2006 over half of respondents (52%) stated that they 
had a lot of control over their personal data. The difference in control over personal data during 
the last decade demonstrates how advancements in information communication technologies 
(ICTs) has changed how individuals store their personal data, thus leading to lower levels of 
personal autonomy over that data.  
In sum, univariate analyses performed suggest that respondents’ knowledge of 
surveillance technologies and associated laws is low. Most of respondents appear to be not very 
knowledgeable about the surveillance changes that took place after 9/11, including the changes 
and the creation of new laws and agencies. In terms of sharing data to third parties, only 15% of 
respondents felt that this practice was completely acceptable. Slightly over one-third of 
respondents felt that government and private agencies’ ability to share personal data to third 
parties was completely unacceptable. Additionally, when respondents were asked about the data 
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mining capabilities of government and private agencies, respondents were more supportive of 
government agencies than private agencies. For example, when respondents were asked about 
specific data mining scenarios in which government (i.e. law enforcement) and private agencies 
can collect personal information, respondents were opposed to private agencies more so than 
police agencies. Conversely, in terms of trust in government and private agencies to develop 
legislation that protects the personal information of citizens, respondents were more trusting in 
private agencies rather than government agencies. Thus, it appears that respondents are 
articulating situational differences in which they trust and support government and private 
agencies. The following sections will discuss why these situational differences may occur by 
further examining the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.  
Bivariate Analyses 
 Bivariate analyses were conducted to examine the magnitude and nature of the 
relationship between the independent variables (i.e. socio-demographic variables, knowledge of 
surveillance technology, knowledge of laws and agencies created after 9/11, effectiveness of 
privacy laws, and the intrusiveness of national security laws) on the dependent variables (i.e. 
acceptability of data sharing, trust in government and private agencies, and support for data 
mining). Results of these analyses were significant for all correlation analyses except for the 
intrusiveness of national security laws on support for data mining by police/intelligence 
agencies.  
The correlational analysis revealed that all of the dependent variables (acceptability of 
data sharing in government and private agencies, support for data mining in government and 
private agencies, and trust in government and private agencies) had a moderately strong and (p < 
.05) correlation (r = .74, .62, .60, respectively). However, only one of the independent variables 
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(effectiveness of privacy laws) revealed a significant correlation with trust in government 
agencies (r = .63) and trust in private agencies (r = .60), indicating the persons with higher 
ratings on the effectiveness of privacy laws were associated with higher ratings of trust in 
government and private agencies. The findings of these analyses are summarized below in Table 
6.  
Table 6. Bivariate Correlation Analysis of Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
Pearson’s Correlation 
"#$$%&'#()*)'+,#'#	./#")01123.		#1%0$)%. " #$$%&'#()*)'+,#'#	./#")01&")3.		#1%0$)%. " .5&&2"'	62",#'#	7)0)01123.		#1%0$)%. " .5&&2"'	62",#'#	7)0)01&")3.		#1%0$)%. " '"5.'	)0	123.#1%0$)%. " '"5.'	)0	&")3#'%#1%0$)%. 
Acceptability: Gov. Agencies 1 .74*     
Acceptability: Priv. Agencies .74* 1     
Support: Gov. Agencies   1 .62*   
Support Priv. Agencies   .62* 1   
Trust Gov. Agencies     1 .60 
Trust Priv. Agencies     .60 1 
Independent Variables       
Knowledge of Surveillance 
Technology .23* .27* .13* .29* .21* .24* 
Knowledge of Surveillance 
Laws and Agencies after 9/11 .37* .37* .26* .39* .35* .32* 
Effectiveness of Privacy 
Laws .35* .32* .29* .35* .63* .60* 
Intrusiveness of National 
Security Laws .25* .19* .02 .12* .17* .16* 
 
A series of one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests were performed to assess the 
nature and magnitude of the mean differences on the dependent variables (i.e. acceptability, 
support, and trust) for each category of the respondent’s socio-demographic attributes. These 
results are presented in Appendix B and summarized below.  
To start, significant differences in these mean ratings on the dependent variables were 
observed across all five racial stratums. There were significant differences (p < .05) between 
racial groups in support for data mining in government agencies [F, (4, 517) = 2.40] and private 
agencies [F, (4, 517) = 3.20].  For government agencies’ data mining capabilities individuals 
within the Two or More Races/Other stratum exhibited the highest opposition to these practices 
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(M=3.0) in comparison to Whites (2.8), Hispanics (2.7), Blacks (2.7), Asians (2.9). For private 
agencies and their data mining capabilities, all racial stratums had mean ratings representing 
moderate levels of opposition to these practices (i.e. 3.20) with individuals within the Two or 
More/Other racial stratum having the highest mean score (3.45) in comparison to Whites (3.15), 
Hispanics (3.19), Blacks, (3.03), and Asians (3.15).  
Similarly, significant differences between the means were also observed for trust in 
government [F, (4, 517) = 2.72, p < .05] and trust in private agencies [F, (4. 517) = 3.96, p < 
.05]. Specifically, individuals within the Two or More Races/Other stratum reported fairly low 
levels of trust in government agencies (3.3) in comparison to Whites (2.7), Hispanics (2.8), 
Blacks (2.9), and Asians (2.8), which had moderate levels of trust. In contrast, all racial stratums 
had reasonably high levels of trust in private agencies with Whites (2.7), Hispanics (2.4), Blacks 
(2.7), Asians (2.9), and Two or More Races/Other (2.9).  
Marginally significant differences (p < .10) were also found across racial stratums for 
acceptability of data sharing in private agencies [F, (4, 517) = 2.65, p < .061]. Across all of the 
racial stratums, individuals that identified as Two or More Races/Other had the highest observed 
mean score, indicating that, on average, they had the lowest acceptability, support, and trust in 
government and private agencies data sharing and data mining abilities when compared to 
Whites, Hispanics, African-Americans, and Asians.45 
                                                
45 Post Hoc Tests were also performed to examine which racial groups had significant differences in terms their mean score on 
the dependent variables. The findings of the Post Hoc testing revealed significant differences between whites and multiracial 
respondents regarding the acceptability of data sharing by private agencies (p < .10). In terms of support for data mining by 
police agencies, significant differences were found between multi-racial respondents and Hispanic, Asians, African Americans (p 
< .10). Similarly, for support for data mining by private agencies significant differences were found between multi racial 
respondents and African Americans (p < .05). Lastly, for trust in government agencies significant differences were found 
between multi-racial respondents and Hispanics (p < .10) and Whites (p < .05); for private agencies, significant differences were 
also found between Hispanics, Asians, and multi-racial respondents (p < .05).  
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In terms of gender, significant differences were found between the means of male-
identified and female-identified respondents. Specifically, these differences were observed in 
terms of the acceptability of data sharing in private agencies [F, (1, 521) = 3.37, p < .05] and in 
terms of support for data mining in private agencies [F (1, 521) = 4.25, p < .05]. On average, 
females viewed data sharing as acceptable only if the private agencies had obtained the consent 
of the customer (M=3.1), whereas males viewed data sharing as acceptable if the customer is 
suspected of wrong-doing (M=2.9). In terms of support for data mining in private agencies, both 
females (M= 3.2) and males (M=3.1) were moderately opposed. These findings reveal that the 
mean scores for females were slightly higher than the mean scores for males, suggesting 
statistically small differences in gender in terms of the acceptability of data sharing to third 
parties by private agencies and support for data mining in private agencies. 
In terms of level of education, the results of this analysis revealed no significant 
differences. Specifically, the means for individuals with a college degree and individuals without 
a college degree were similar across all dependent variables. However, there were significant 
differences between older (age ≥ 35) and younger (age ≤ 34) respondents. Older respondents had 
slightly higher means than younger respondents. Differences in means were found in the 
acceptability of data sharing for government agencies. On average, older respondents felt that the 
sharing of data between government agencies to third parties was acceptable as long as the 
government had obtained the consent of the citizen (M=3.1). In comparison, younger 
respondents felt that data sharing was okay if the citizen was suspected of wrong-doing (M=2.9). 
These differences were significant at the p < .10, level. Similarly, older respondents were 
significantly (p < .05) less supportive and less trusting of government and private agencies when 
compared to younger respondents.  
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In terms of religious background, the findings of this analysis revealed significant 
differences between individuals who identified as having a religion compared to individuals that 
did not. There were significant differences (p < .05) between the means in terms of support for 
data mining in private agencies and trust in government and private agencies. These findings 
reveal that individuals that do not identify with a religion are moderately opposed (M=3.3) to the 
data mining capabilities of private agencies compared to individuals that identify with having a 
religion (M=3.1). Similarly, individuals that did not identify with a religion were also less 
trusting in government (M=3.1) and private agencies (M=3.0), compared to those that identified 
with a religion (M=2.8, for government agencies, and M=2.6 for private agencies).  
Lastly, in terms of economic markers (i.e. annual household income), significant 
differences in the acceptability of data sharing in government agencies were found. Specifically, 
individuals that made less than $50,000 per year responded on average (M=3.2) that data sharing 
was acceptable in government agencies as long as the government had obtained the consent of 
the citizen [F (1, 521) = 5.579, p < .05]. In comparison, individuals that made over $50,000 per 
year stated on average (M=2.9) that data sharing between government agencies and third parties 
was acceptable if the citizen was suspected of wrong-doing. This finding is important, 
considering government agencies currently do not need the consent of the citizen in order to 
share data with third party agencies.  
Overall, the results of this bivariate analysis reveal that individuals who view privacy 
laws as ineffective are less trusting of government and private agencies. Yet, individual 
differences were noted for respondents in five self-identified racial markers. Again, multi-racial 
identified respondents had the lowest acceptability, support, and trust in government and private 
agencies data sharing and data mining abilities. There were also noted differences between male- 
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and female- identified respondents’ views on data sharing by public agencies; between older- 
and younger- respondents’ support and trust of government and private agencies; between 
religious and non-religious respondents’ acceptance of data mining capabilities as well as trust in 
government and private agencies; and between wealthy and less wealthy respondents’ 
acceptance of data sharing between government and third parties. Overall, then, individuals 
differ significantly in terms of their 1) acceptability of data sharing to third parties by 
government and private agencies, 2) support for data mining by government and private 
agencies, and 3) trust in government and private agencies.   
Multivariate Analyses 
 A series of multivariate linear regression analyses46 were used to assess the predictors of 
acceptability of data sharing, support for data mining, and trust in government and private 
agencies. For each dependent variable, two models were estimated. The first model includes only 
socio-demographic variables. The second model, adds the remaining independent variables (i.e. 
knowledge of surveillance technology and laws, the effectiveness of privacy laws, and the 
intrusiveness of national security laws). By comparing the results of Model 1 and Model 2, it is 
possible to evaluate the relative importance of select independent variables after statistical 
controls were introduced. The results of these analyses are summarized for each dependent 
variable in Tables 7, 8, and 9. Overall, these analyses reveal that, as the effectiveness of privacy 
laws and knowledge of laws/agencies created after 9/11 increases, the acceptability, support, and 
trust in government and private agencies data sharing and data mining capabilities decreases. 
Therefore, individual knowledge about surveillance technology and applicable laws is important 
                                                
46 In addition to running a linear regression, an ordinal logistic regression was also conducted to compare the two analyses. 
Overall, the analyses revealed similar findings to one another, therefore confirming the results of this research.  
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in understanding levels of public acceptability, support, and trust of both governmental and 
private agencies use of surveillance.    
Acceptability of Data Sharing: Government Agencies  
 As shown in Model 1 in Table 7, only 4% of the variation in the acceptability of data 
sharing in government agencies can be explained by socio-demographic variables [89= .043, F 
(9, 511) = 2.55, p < .001]. Specifically, the linear regression suggests, that male-identified 
individuals as well as individuals with an annual income higher than $50,000 per year viewed 
government data sharing as more acceptable. Individuals that were over the age of 34 viewed 
data sharing of government agencies as less acceptable.  
A comparable linear regression analysis is presented in Model 2 for predicting the 
acceptability of data sharing in government agencies. Overall, 23% of the variation in the 
acceptability of data sharing of government agencies could be explained by individual’s 
knowledge of surveillance technology, knowledge of laws and agencies created after 9/11, views 
of the effectiveness of privacy laws, views on the intrusiveness of national security laws, age, 
and income [89= .225, F (13, 507) =11.32, p < .001].  Specifically, the linear regression suggests, 
that knowledge of laws and agencies created after 9/11, views on the effectiveness of privacy 
laws, and the intrusiveness of national security laws had significant influence on the likelihood 
of data sharing in government agencies being less acceptable. Again, level of knowledge about 
applicable surveillance laws impact acceptance for government and private use of data mining 
and data sharing capabilities.  
Acceptability of Data Sharing: Private Agencies  
As shown below in Model 3, 5% of the variation in the acceptability of data sharing in 
private agencies can be explained by socio-demographic variables [89= .051, F (9, 511) = 11.32, 
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p < .001]. Specifically, individuals that identified as Two or More Races/Other Asian, or were 
over the age of 34 (i.e. older respondents) viewed the data sharing of private agencies as less 
acceptable. Conversely, individuals who were religious and individuals that made over $50,000 
per year were more likely to view data sharing abilities of private agencies as acceptable.  
Table 7: Multivariate Linear Regression Model 
Acceptability of Government and Private Agencies to Share Data to Third Parties 
 
 
 
Variable 
Acceptability 
of Data Sharing 
Government Agencies 
 
Acceptability of Data 
Sharing Private 
Agencies 
Model 1 
B 
Model 2 
B 
Model 3 
B 
Model 4 
B 
Knowledge of Surveillance 
Technology 
 
 
 
-.175* 
 
  
-.008 
Knowledge of Laws and Agencies 
Created After 9/11 
  
.457* 
  
.407* 
Effectiveness of Privacy Laws 
  
.257* 
 
  
.209* 
. 
Intrusiveness of National Security 
Laws 
  
.142* 
  
.078* 
     
Race     
     Hispanic .142 .107 .152 .146 
     Black -.002 -.039 .249 .236 
     Asian  .288 .069 .416* .227 
     Two or More Races/Other .248 .094 .392* .246 
 
Gender     
   Male -.203* -.083 -.233* -.113 
 
Education     
    College Degree -.011 .064 .014 .095 
 
Age     
   Age ≥ 34 .277*  .180* .279* .167 
 
Religion     
   Identifies with a Religion -.172 -.004 -.140 .020 
 
Income     
  Annual Income ≥ $50,000 -.254*  -.206* -.230* -.173 :;= .043 .225 .051 .201 
N = 521 521 521 521 
Note: Table values represent the standardized regression coefficients. The reference group for the 
categorical variables include the following: Race (White) Gender (Female), Education (No College Degree),  
Age (≤ 34), Religion (No religion), and Income (≤ $50,000). *p < .05 
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A comparable linear regression analysis is presented in Model 4, which added individual 
knowledge and views on privacy laws. First, the overall fit of the model increased, indicating 
that 20% of the variation in the acceptability of data sharing capabilities of private agencies 
could be explained by all of the independent variables [89= .201, F (13, 507) = 9.84 p < .01]. 
Second, among the particular variables, knowledge of laws and agencies after 9/11, views on the 
effectiveness of privacy laws, and the intrusiveness of national security laws were significant in 
the likelihood of viewing private agencies’ data sharing capabilities as less acceptable.  
Support for Data Mining: Government Agencies  
 As shown below in Table 8, Model 1, 4% of the variation in support for data mining by 
government agencies can be explained by socio-demographic variables [89= .045, F (9, 511) = 
2.64, p < .01]. For individuals whom identified as Two or More Races/Other, or were over the 
age of 34 increased, opposition to the data mining capabilities of government agencies was 
greater. Conversely, for individuals that were religious, or who made over $50,000 increased, 
support for government agencies data mining abilities also increased, when controlling for all 
other variables in the analysis 
A comparable linear regression analysis is presented in Model 2, which added the 
remaining independent variables to the regression model. The regression model increased, 
indicating that 14% of the variation in support for data mining in government agencies can be 
explained by socio-demographic variables and levels of knowledge, effectiveness, and 
intrusiveness of privacy laws [89= .139, F (13, 507) = 6.301, p < .01]. The findings of this model 
reveal that as knowledge of laws and agencies after 9/11, views on the effectiveness of privacy 
laws, and the age of the individual increased opposition to data mining was higher. Conversely, 
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as knowledge of surveillance technology increased support for government’s data mining 
abilities did as well.  
 
Table 8: Multivariate Linear Regression Model 
Support for Government and Private Agencies  
Data Mining Abilities After 9/11 
 
 
 
Variable 
Support for Data Mining 
Government Agencies 
Support for Data 
Mining Private Agencies 
Model 1 
B 
Model 2 
B 
Model 3 
B 
Model 4 
B 
Knowledge of Surveillance 
Technology 
  
 -.165* 
  
.011 
Knowledge of Laws and Agencies 
Created After 9/11 
  
 .321* 
  
.344* 
Effectiveness of Privacy Laws    .213* 
  
.193* 
Intrusiveness of National Security 
Laws 
  
-.040 
  
.009 
     
Race     
     Hispanic -.010 .004 .155 .167 
     Black -047 -.039 -.077 -.073 
     Asian .148 .065 .076 -.060 
     Two or More Races/Other  .297* .222  .364*  .247* 
 
Gender     
   Male -.093 -.060 -.210* -.122 
 
Education     
    College Degree -.034 -.032 -.034 .021 
 
Age     
   Age ≥ 34  .274* .260* .436* .334* 
 
Religion     
   Identifies with a Religion  -.205* -.089 -.305* -.165* 
 
Income     
  Annual Income ≥ $50,000 -.008* .004 .018 .064 :;= .045 .139 .099 .250 
N = 521 521 521 521 
Note: Table values represent the standardized regression coefficients. The reference group for the 
categorical variables include the following: Race (White) Gender (Female), Education (No College Degree),  
Age (≤ 34), Religion (No religion), and Income (≤ $50,000). *p < .05. 
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Support for Data Mining: Private Agencies  
 As shown above in Model 3, 10% of the variation in support for data mining in private 
agencies can be explained by socio-demographic variables [89= .099, F (9, 511) = 6.21, p < .01]. 
Individuals that identified as Two or More Races/Other or were over the age of 34 were more 
likely to oppose private agencies data mining abilities. In comparison, individuals that were 
religious or were male-identified respondents were significantly more likely to support private 
agencies data mining abilities.  
A comparable linear regression analysis is presented in Model 4, adding the remaining 
independent variables. The regression model increased, indicating that 25% of the variation in 
support for private agencies data mining abilities can be explained by socio-demographic 
variables, levels of knowledge, and effectiveness of privacy laws [89= .250. F (13, 507) = 13.01, 
p < .01]. As knowledge of laws, the effectiveness of privacy laws, individuals of Two or More 
Races/Other, and age increased, support for government and private agencies data mining 
abilities decreased. Conversely, as religious identification increased, support for data mining in 
private agencies also increased. 
Trust in Government Agencies 
 As shown below in Model 1, Table 9, 5% of the variation in trust in government can be 
explained by socio-demographic variables [89= .053, F (9, 511) = 3.15, p < .01]. Individuals that 
were over the age of 34 or identified as Two or More Races/Other were less likely to trust that 
the government is balancing national security rights with individual rights appropriately. 
Conversely, as individuals that identified with a religion increased trust in the government also 
increased.  
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Table 9: Multivariate Linear Regression Model  
Trust in Government and Private Agencies  
 
 
 
Variable 
Trust in Government 
Agencies 
Trust in Private 
Agencies 
Model 1 
B 
Model 2 
B 
Model 3 
B 
Model 4 
B 
Knowledge of Surveillance 
Technology 
  
-.096 
 
  
.036 
Knowledge of Laws and Agencies 
Created After 9/11 
  
.195* 
  
.055 
Effectiveness of Privacy Laws   .670* 
  
.637* 
Intrusiveness of National Security 
Laws 
  
.043 
  
.033 
     
Race     
     Hispanic .107 .090 -.158 -.170 
     Black .174 .141 .012 -.018 
     Asian .079 -.057 .249 .148 
     Two or More Races/Other  .433* .189 .247* .039 
 
Gender     
   Male -.040 .029 -.033 .028 
 
Education     
    College Degree .059 .041 .079 .060 
 
Age     
   Age ≥ 34  .252* .121 .307* .184* 
 
Religion     
   Identifies with a Religion -.375* -.078 -.314* -.037 
 
Income     
  Annual Income ≥ $50,000 -.017 .058 -.166* -.084 :;= .053 .423 .067 .388 
N = 521 521 521 521 
Note: Table values represent the standardized regression coefficients. The reference group for the 
categorical variables include the following: Race (White) Gender (Female), Education (No College Degree),  
Age (≤ 34), Religion (No religion), and Income (≤ $50,000). *p < .05. 
 
A comparable linear regression analysis is presented above in Model 2. The findings of 
this analysis suggests that as knowledge of laws and agencies, and perceived effectiveness of 
privacy laws increased, trust that the United States government is balancing national security and 
individual rights appropriately decreased. Specifically, this regression model indicates that 42% 
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of the variation in distrust in government can be explained by the effectiveness of privacy laws 
and knowledge of laws and agencies created after 9/11. This finding indicates that as individuals 
increase in the level of knowledge of laws and agencies created after 9/11 as well as perceive 
privacy laws as being ineffective, its is then that trust in the government decreases.  
Trust in Private Agencies 
As shown above in Model 3, 7% of the variation in trust in private agencies can be 
explained by socio-demographic variables [89= .067, F (9, 511) = 4.089, p < .01]. Similar to trust 
in government agencies, as individuals that were over the age of 34 or identified as Two or More 
Races/Other increased trust in private agencies decreased. However, as respondents that 
identified with a religion increased as did trust in private agencies.  
A comparable linear regression analysis is presented in Model 4, suggesting that 39% of 
the variation in trust in private agencies is explained by all of the independent variables. 
Specifically, this model reveals that views on the effectiveness of privacy laws can predict 
decreased levels of trust in private companies to protect the personal data of citizens. Similarly, 
as the age of the respondent increases the level of trust in private agencies to protect their 
personal data decreases.  
In sum, the findings of the multivariate analyses suggest that there are generally specific 
socio-demographic variables that are able to predict increased or decreased trust in the 
acceptability, support, and trust in government and private agencies. Additionally, knowledge of 
surveillance technology, knowledge of laws and agencies created after 9/11, the effectiveness of 
privacy laws, and the intrusiveness of national security laws were also useful in determining 
variability in the dependent variables. These findings are discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
The study of surveillance in government and private agencies is relatively new discipline 
within academia. The transformation and growth of surveillance in aspects of everyday life has 
led to scholars examining the impact of surveillance on individual privacy. In an effort to expand 
upon previous research conducted on privacy and surveillance, the current study evaluated socio-
demographic differences between individuals in the United States in terms of their acceptability, 
support, and trust in government and private agencies’ surveillance capabilities. Specifically, this 
was accomplished by utilizing the online survey platform Qualtrics in order to recruit 
respondents from diverse socio-demographic backgrounds, with the goal of comparing the 
findings of this research to previous studies.  
Utilizing theoretical frameworks that integrate surveillance theories and privacy theories, 
this study set out to address three research questions: 1) Are there individual demographic 
differences between respondents in levels of acceptability, trust, and support of government and 
private agencies data sharing and data mining capabilities? 2) Does individual knowledge of 
surveillance technologies and laws influence levels of acceptability, trust, and support of 
government and private agencies’ surveillance capabilities? 3) Are individuals more concerned 
with government or private agencies’ surveillance abilities? Findings to these questions are 
discussed below and compared to previous research.  
Research Question 1: Are there individual demographic differences between respondents in 
levels of acceptability, trust, and support of government and private agencies data sharing and 
data mining capabilities? 
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Beginning with the first research question, this study hypothesized that individuals would 
differ significantly between socio-demographic characteristics. Specifically, this was 
hypothesized due to research that suggests that surveillance not being conducted equitably across 
socio-demographic groups (Koskela, 2012). Findings from the bivariate analyses indicate that 
there were significant differences between racial stratums, gender, age, religion, and income. The 
most significant differences were found between racial stratums. For example, individuals within 
the Two or More Races/Other category had significantly higher means compared to Whites, 
Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Additionally, this finding was confirmed in the multivariate 
analysis, which showed that, individuals that identify as two or more races/other are less 
supportive and trusting they are in government and private agencies data mining and data sharing 
capabilities, when compared to Whites. 
These finding are important because previous research conducted by the GPD project in 
2014 was only able to survey individuals that were White (71%), African American (10%), 
Hispanic (13%), and Asian/Pacific Islander (6%). The goal of this research was to include 
individuals from different socio-demographic backgrounds. In doing so, comparisons can be 
made across a rage of demographic descriptors. Additionally, it was crucial for this research to 
sample individuals from harder to reach populations (i.e. groups that have not been included in 
prior research) in order to allow the opportunity for their voices to be heard. Overall, these socio-
demographic differences are most visible in the multivariate regression analysis, which suggests 
that in comparison to Whites, individuals that identify as Two or More Races/Other are more 
likely to be less accepting, trusting, and supportive of government and private agencies data 
mining/data sharing capabilities. Please see Tables 7, 8, and 9.   
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Research Question 2: Does individual knowledge of surveillance technologies and laws 
influence levels of acceptability, trust, and support of government and private agencies’ 
surveillance capabilities? 
According to the Privacy Calculus Model, it is important to evaluate individual 
experiences and awareness of privacy in order to understand differences between individual 
privacy concerns (Dinev et al., 2008). Knowledge of surveillance technology, as well as laws and 
agencies created after 9/11, were important independent variables utilized to measure differences 
in the acceptability, support, and trust in government and private agencies’ surveillance 
capabilities. This research hypothesized that respondents would not be very knowledgeable about 
laws and agencies created after 9/11, due to being disciplined and controlled to accept invasive 
surveillance practices for safety and security (Allmer, 2015) post- 9/11.   
Previous research conducted by Smith and Lyon (2014) confirmed that individuals were 
not very knowledgeable about complex forms of surveillance technology. These findings held 
true for this research, with only 17% of individuals being very knowledgeable about data mining 
and 16% being very knowledgeable about biometrics or radio frequency identification. Similarly, 
this research also found that less than 25% of individuals surveyed reported being very 
knowledgeable of laws passed after 9/11 (i.e. the USA Patriot Act) and agencies created after 
9/11 (i.e. the Department of Homeland Security and fusion centers). Bivariate and multivariate 
analyses revealed that knowledge of surveillance technology and laws and agencies created after 
9/11 were important factors in determining the acceptability, support, and trust in government 
and private agencies’ data mining and data sharing abilities. 
Specifically, the results of these analyses revealed two interesting outcomes. The first 
suggests that, overall, knowledge about surveillance and applicable laws is important. Similar to 
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technological literacy, herein, a surveillance literacy seems to be impacting respondents’ 
acceptability, support, and trust in government and private agencies’ surveillance capabilities as 
well as relevant privacy concerns.  
Overall, findings herein suggest that individuals were not knowledgeable about the data 
sharing capabilities of government and private agencies. On average, individuals stated that data 
sharing between government and private agencies was acceptable if an individual was suspected 
of wrong-doing (esp. for White men r individuals of older ages) or if they agency had consent 
from the citizen (esp. for female identified respondents). Yet, currently, there is no expectation 
for government and private agencies to have probable cause when sharing data between sectors 
nor is there any expectation for these agencies to obtain consent from the individual before 
sharing their personal data (Monahan, 2010). There is a clear disjuncture between respondents’ 
understandings of when sharing of personal data is acceptable and the realities of when 
government and private agencies actually do share data.  
This finding reveals that individuals are articulating expectations of privacy that the 
personal data stored in government and private agencies is “private.” For example, respondents 
suggested that the information that is stored in private agencies (i.e. bank records, credit scores, 
phone records, etc.) should only be accessed if an individual is expected of wrong-doing or if the 
agency consents with the citizen prior to sharing their personal information. This finding can be 
related back to the Social Network Theory of Privacy, which argues that transactional 
information stored in government and private agencies is sensitive, suggesting that courts should 
protect citizens from unwanted sharing of their personal data between government/private 
agencies and third parties (Strahilevtiz, 2005).  
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The second outcome revealed that the more knowledgeable individuals were about the 
changes that took place after 9/11, the less acceptable, supportive, and trusting they were in 
government and private agencies data sharing and data mining capabilities. This finding 
advocates for the importance of society being knowledgeable on the legislative changes that took 
place after 9/11. Specifically, this finding argues for more research to be conducted that provides 
citizens with examples of different forms of surveillance. Previous research, confirms that over 
half of Americans are concerned about government agencies’ surveillance capabilities, regarding 
their access to personal data and electronic communication (Pew, 2009) yet, what do they know 
about these capabilities? And in what scenarios? 
Importantly, this research was able to provide individuals with examples of surveillance 
being performed through data mining tactics. By providing individuals with examples of data 
mining this research discovered that individuals are strongly opposed to the data mining 
capabilities of government and private agencies (50% for private agencies and 30% for 
government agencies) even though individuals report low levels of knowledge on precisely what 
data mining is.  
Research Question 3: Are individuals more concerned with government or private agencies’ 
surveillance capabilities? 
Due to both government and private agencies possessing the same surveillance 
capabilities, it was important for this study to try and understand if surveillance was more 
concerning when performed by government agencies or private agencies. Previous research 
conducted by Zureik in 2010, found that individuals in the United States had more trust in 
private companies (49.3%) in comparison to government agencies (38.5%). However, in terms of 
control over personal information, previous research also discovered that individuals are 
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articulating a loss of autonomy over their personal information that is stored in private agencies 
(Pew, 2016).  
In terms of the acceptability, support, and trust in government and private agencies’ 
surveillance capabilities, levels of concern varied. For example, individuals viewed sharing of 
data in government agencies as more acceptable than private agencies and were also more 
supportive of their data mining capabilities. However, when individuals were asked if they 
trusted government agencies to guard their personal information, respondents had higher levels 
of trust in private agencies (45%) than government agencies (38%). The findings of this research 
suggest that, in terms of surveillance abilities (data sharing and data mining), individuals are 
more supportive and accepting of these practices in government agencies but are more trusting of 
private agencies to guard their personal information. 
In sum, understanding exactly how citizens in the United States feel about the 
surveillance capabilities of government and private agencies is complicated. However, this 
research was able to discover that individuals do significantly differ in terms of the acceptability, 
support, and trust of government and private agencies’ surveillance capabilities. Therefore, 
findings of this research does highlight the reality that individuals from a range of different 
socio-demographic backgrounds may not respond uniformly to a range of surveillance scenarios. 
Indeed, the results of this research does confirm that individuals differ depending upon their race, 
gender, age, religion, and income in terms of the amount in which they acceptability, trust, and 
support for surveillance being conducted by government or private agencies (or those in power). 
These findings build off of previously mentioned research that suggests that more research needs 
to be completed on the impacts of surveillance across socio-demographic groups (ACLU, 2016 
Allmer, 2015; Monahan, 2010, Koskela, 2012; Bennett et al., 2014).   
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Additionally, this research discovered the important relationship between having 
knowledge of surveillance laws and agencies created after 9/11 in terms of acceptability, support 
and trust in government and private agencies. Specifically, the findings of this research suggest 
that, as knowledge of surveillance laws increases, levels of trust in government and private 
agencies’ data sharing and data mining capabilities decreases. Similar findings were also 
discovered in terms of the acceptability of privacy laws as well as the intrusiveness of national 
security laws. These findings reveal the importance in evaluating individual awareness of 
privacy in order to understand how this can influence their levels of trust and support in 
government and private agencies (Dinev et al., 2008). It also suggests that a surveillance literacy 
is important in understanding individual’s thoughts about a range of privacy rights concerns.   
Lastly, it appears that individuals are concerned about government and private agencies’ 
surveillance capabilities for different reasons. Context seems to be important. More research 
should be dedicated to similar projects that provide a range of surveillance and privacy scenarios. 
Specifically, the findings of this research suggest that individuals are less trusting in government 
agencies than private agencies in terms of their personal privacy. However, individuals are more 
supportive and accepting of government agencies when it comes to surveillance (i.e. data sharing 
and data mining) in comparison to private agencies.  
Overall, these findings highlight different aspects of privacy and surveillance theories. It 
is important for more research to be conducted that builds upon this dialogue, in order to better 
understand and conceptualize how individuals feel about the surveillance capabilities of 
government and private agencies, in what contexts, and for what reasons.  
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Strengths and Limitations  
 In terms of this research being conducted through the use online survey platform 
Qualtrics, it is important to examine the strengths and limitations of the research design. 
According to Singleton and Straits (2005), the basic idea of a survey is to measure variables by 
asking people questions and then examining the relationship among those measures. The 
following section will summarize the noted strengths and limitations with conducting research 
online.  
Benefits of Online Surveys 
 There are many benefits associated with conducting surveys online. First, online surveys 
allow the respondent the time and flexibility to complete the survey at their own convenience. In 
turn, this level of convenience generates responses much more quickly than other forms of 
traditional surveys. Second, the use of the Internet allows for the researcher to ask questions 
without physically having to be present during the survey. Thus, concerns with 
researcher/interviewer bias is decreased. Third, online surveys have un-restricted geographical 
coverage (i.e. as long as the respondent has a computer/Internet, they can take the survey 
regardless of location). On-line platforms are also able to provide anonymity for respondents. 
Fourth, online surveys are extremely cost-effective. This research was able to target individuals 
in the United States that were over the age of 18 efficiently with the financial support of the 
Criminal Justice Department at UNLV and with the assistance of the panelist specialists at 
Qualtrics.  
Limitations of Online Surveys 
To begin, one of the most problematic issues when conducting online surveys is being 
constrained to samples of individuals that have access to the Internet. Certain populations lack 
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access to the Internet and many individuals do not feel secure in providing their information 
online. In regards to the current study, this limitation was particularly concerning. Due to this 
research investigating differences between socio-demographic groups, it is reasonable to 
conclude that this research excluded a variety of individuals that are either not proficient with 
technology or are not affluent enough to afford technology.  
Additionally, Kevin Haggerty and Amber Gazso (2005), suggest that when conducting 
public opinion research on privacy and surveillance, researchers should also be cautious of the 
nonresponse rates and the likelihood of having an overrepresentation of “pro-surveillance” 
respondents apposed to those who are “anti-surveillance.” If individuals are concerned about 
their privacy, the likelihood of those same individuals partaking in an online study is relatively 
low, therefore this research engages in a bit of selection and sampling bias.  
Another potential limitation of surveys is determining if respondents are being truthful. It 
is hard to know if respondents are who they claim to be and if they are answering survey 
questions truthfully. Regarding this research, Qualtrics was able to track the consistency of 
respondent’s socio-demographic identification within their system, but even so this still does not 
completely verify the individual’s identity. Lastly, one of the main limitations of surveys is that 
they are not as useful in determining the association between two variables. Specifically, survey 
research is unable to explain the cause and effect of two variables (Singleton and Straits, 2005).  
Overall, the strengths associated with online surveys outweighed the limitations. Through 
online survey methods, this research was able to strategically target individuals of diverse socio-
demographic backgrounds without being constrained geographically. Additionally, this research 
was able to be conducted quickly and was also extremely cost effective. The results of this 
research are also timely and important, as this is the first project to purposively recruit 
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respondents from a range of socio-demographic backgrounds and compare responses throughout. 
Therefore, the context associated with attitudes in terms of their thoughts and feelings of 
surveillance and privacy is a benefit.   
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
Surveillance regimes adopted as anti-terrorism measures have had a profound, chilling 
effect on other fundamental human rights. In addition to constituting a right in itself, 
privacy serves as a basis for other rights and without which the other rights would not be 
effectively enjoyed. Privacy is necessary to create zones to allow individuals and groups 
to be able to think and develop ideas and relationships. Other rights such as freedom of 
expression, association, and movement all require privacy to be able to develop 
effectively. Surveillance has also resulted in the miscarriages of justice, leading to 
failures of due process and wrongful arrest. – United Nations (2009)47.  
 
 The above quote, from Martin Scheinin, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedom While Countering Terrorism, demonstrates how surveillance has restraining effects on 
the actions of individuals globally. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, government and 
private agencies have participated in a surveillance assemblage, in which both agencies engage 
in surveillance through data mining (Haggerty et al., 2012). The combining of federal, state, and 
private agencies has led to a blurring of boundaries between what information kinds of 
information should be considered public versus private. Additionally, surveillance is not just 
being conducted in its traditional form of just “watching” from a far. Rather, surveillance today 
is best thought of as a “social sorting” that has disproportionate consequences for specific groups 
of populations (Lyon, 2009).48   
The goal of this research was to understand how individuals of diverse socio-
demographic backgrounds felt about surveillance being conducted by government and private 
agencies. Specifically, this research was focused on understanding the level of knowledge 
                                                
47 United Nations. Human Rights Council. (2009). Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development. (Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin).  
48 Lyon, D (2009). Surveillance After September 11, Cambridge: Polity Press.  
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citizens in the United States had of surveillance technology and laws and agencies created after 
9/11 as well as to examine the attitudes of citizens on the intrusiveness and effectiveness of 
privacy and national security laws.  
In terms of policy implications, the USA Freedom Act was passed in 2015, modifying 
some of the intrusive surveillance provisions of the USA Patriot Act. Specifically, the USA 
Freedom Act required the NSA to end the wholesale collection of phone records and transition to 
acquiring the call logs of targets under investigation.49 However, the passing of the Freedom Act 
still leaves other government surveillance powers intact. For example, the government is still 
able to access the Internet searches of citizens as well as the data they share with third party 
agencies (i.e. private companies). The finding of this research reveals the importance of 
educating citizens in the United States on the surveillance capabilities of government and private 
agencies. Specifically, educating citizens is important in order for future research to have more 
informed conversations on how expectations of privacy have changed because of the creation of 
new national security laws, the sharing of data between federal, state, and private agencies, as 
well as the advancement of surveillance technology.  
Theoretically, this research was guided by the idea of surveillance being performed by 
government and private agencies panoptically, suggesting that surveillance is not neutral and that 
individuals are categorized and sorted by government and private agencies based on “risk.” 
Allowing government and private agencies the discretion to panoptically surveillance individuals 
in the United States, without establishing probable cause first, has led to abuses of power and 
increased surveillance for individuals in certain socio-demographic groups for all crimes, not just 
crimes involving terrorism. This study revealed that the more knowledgeable individuals were 
                                                
49 Information on the USA Freedom Act: https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/02/senate-passes-freedom-act-ending-
patriot-act-provision-lapse 
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about the effectiveness of privacy laws and changes that took place after 9/11 the less accepting, 
supporting, and trusting they were of government and private agencies surveillance capabilities. 
 The findings from the present study suggest that understanding how individuals feel 
about surveillance in private and government agencies is a complex undertaking. In general, this 
research was able to confirm that there are significant differences between socio-demographic 
groups in terms of their support, acceptability and trust in government and private agencies. 
Additionally, individuals were more opposed than supportive of the data mining and data sharing 
capabilities in both government and private agencies. While the findings of this research are 
important, it is important to remember that such findings are unable to be generalized. 
Specifically, this research is unable to be generalized due to this research utilizing a non-
probability sampling design, which recruited respondents based on demographic characteristics 
and over sampled for minority respondents. The over sampling of minority respondents could 
contribute to the findings of this research, which leans towards individuals opposing the 
surveillance capabilities of government and private agencies.  
The general takeaways from this research are that most individuals in the United States 
are not very knowledgeable about the advancement of surveillance technology nor the laws and 
agencies created after 9/11. Nevertheless, individuals were still able to articulate the need for 
probable cause or consent to be established for the sharing of data between government and 
private agencies, suggesting the need for the courts to develop a consistent and coherent 
methodology for determining expectations of privacy for the personal data of citizens 
(Strahilevitz, 2005). By expanding upon previous research conducted by the GPD project, this 
research was able to bring citizen’s voices back into the privacy versus security debate, thus 
creating a more inclusive dialogue about privacy, surveillance, and data mining after 9/11. 
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Future Research Directions 
 In order to truly understand how society feels about privacy and surveillance, more 
research needs to be conducted. Smith and Lyon (2014) suggests that in order to understand 
subjectively, how individuals experience surveillance in all aspects of their lives, it is important 
to uncover the more complex picture of how individuals accept, negotiate, comply with, reject, 
ignore, are unaware, engage with, and interact with surveillance (p. 201).  
Specifically, it would be beneficial for research to be conducted that employs a mixed 
method approach, asking individuals both open- and close-ended questions about surveillance 
and privacy. It would be interesting if this research could be done with categories of individuals 
that have already been deemed by government agencies as “suspicious” (i.e. youth, activists, 
delinquents, criminals, and members of other sub-populations typically not included in 
surveillance research). Research project that includes such surveilant subjects would help build 
towards a better understanding of how surveillance after 9/11 is used to panoptically sort 
individuals into categories based on “risk.” Research such as this would also increase our 
understandings of how individuals can be impacted/affected (both positively and negatively) by a 
range of surveillance capabilities utilized by both government and private agencies.  
 The need for more research at the intersections of surveillance and privacy is also 
highlighted by the results/findings of this study. For example, an open-ended “comment” box 
was added to the end of this survey. This space allowed respondents to provide optional feedback 
on their thoughts of the research, questions asked, etc.  The responses obtained were 
overwhelmingly supportive with most individuals stating that this research was interesting and 
that similar research should be conducted in order to expand the findings of this research (and 
past) research. 
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 To conclude, surveillance studies (as a discipline and as a group of scholars) has an 
important role in educating and publicizing what is happening, or what could happen. By 
engaging in more research and raising awareness of the importance of discussing privacy and 
surveillance, society is closer to holding government and private agencies accountable to the 
surveillance practices that they create, adopt, and reproduce.  
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APPENDIX A: Univariate Statistics 
Knowledge of Surveillance Technology and Laws 
 
Responses from survey question #2: How knowledgeable are you about the following: 1) Internet, 2) GPS, 3) RFID, 4) 
CCTV, 5) Biometrics, and 6) Data Mining? 
Knowledge of Surveillance 
Technology 
1. Very 
Knowledgeable 
2. Somewhat 
Knowledgeable 
3. Not Very 
Knowledgeable 
4. Not At All 
Knowledgeable 
Total 
 
                                  
The Internet:  
Total Sample Percentages (n=521) 67.95% 29.94% 1.92% 0.19% 100% 
                        
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 64.40% 33.70% 1.90% 0.00% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 72.40% 23.80% 2.90% 1.00% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 76.00% 22.10% 1.90% 0.00% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 65.40% 35.00% 1.00% 0.00% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 64.00% 29.90% 1.90% 0.00% 100% 
 
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 67.90% 31.00% 1.20% 0.00% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 68.00% 29.50% 2.30% 0.30% 100% 
 
Education:  
1. College (n=244) 70.90% 27.50% 1.60% 0.00% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 65.30% 32.10% 2.20% 0.40% 100% 
      
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
Total Sample Percentages (n=521) 31.86% 45.87% 16.70% 5.57% 100% 
      
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 28.80% 49.00% 16.30% 5.80% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 35.20% 45.70% 16.20% 2.90% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 32.70% 39.40% 19.20% 8.70% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 39.40% 39.40% 15.40% 5.80% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 23.10% 55.80% 16.30% 4.80% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 39.60% 42.90% 13.70% 3.60% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 28.0% 47.30% 18.10% 6.50% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244) 35.70% 46.30% 15.20% 2.90% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 28.50% 45.50% 18.10% 7.90% 100% 
      
Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID)  
Total Sample Percentages (n=521)  
16.51% 29.37% 38.00% 16.12% 100% 
      
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 11.50% 32.70% 39.40% 16.30% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 20.00% 30.50% 38.10% 11.40% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 21.20% 31.70% 34.60% 12.50% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 18.30% 22.10% 39.40% 20.20% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 11.50% 29.80% 38.50% 20.20% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 19.00% 31.50% 38.70% 10.70% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 15.30% 28.30% 37.70% 18.70% 100% 
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Education:  
1. College (n=244) 19.70% 30.70% 35.20% 14.30% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 13.70% 28.20% 40.40% 17.70% 100% 
      
Closed Circuit Television 
Total Sample Percentages (n=521) 22.65% 34.74% 28.02% 14.59% 100% 
      
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 22.10% 37.50% 26.90% 13.50% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 29.50% 27.60% 29.50% 13.30% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 27.90% 37.50% 26.00% 8.70% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 20.20% 36.50% 27.90% 15.40% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 13.50% 34.60% 29.80% 22.10% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 31.50% 31.50% 25.60% 11.30% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 18.40% 36.30% 29.20% 16.10% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244) 25.40% 32.40% 28.30% 13.90% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 20.20% 36.80% 27.80% 15.20% 100% 
      
Biometrics (i.e. Facial Recognition) 
Total Sample Percentages (n=521) 16.70% 29.71% 34.74% 19.39% 100% 
      
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 16.30% 30.80% 33.70% 19.20% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 21.00% 31.40% 32.40% 15.20% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 19.20% 26.90% 36.50% 20.20% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 16.30% 26.90% 36.50% 20.20% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 10.60% 28.80% 34.60% 26.00% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 18.50% 34.50% 33.30% 13.70% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 15.90% 26.60% 35.40% 22.10% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244) 21.70% 31.10% 32.80% 14.30% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 12.30% 27.40% 36.50% 23.80% 100% 
      
Data Mining of Personal 
Information 
Total Sample Percentages (n=521) 
17.47% 28.60% 33.21% 20.73% 100% 
      
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 18.30% 28.80% 32.70% 20.20% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 23.80% 29.50% 27.60% 19.00% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 19.20% 25.00% 37.50% 18.30% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 13.50% 30.80% 36.50% 19.20% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 12.50% 28.80% 31.70% 26.90% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 20.20% 33.90% 31.50% 14.30% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 16.10% 26.10% 34.00% 23.80% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  20.10% 32.80% 30.70% 16.40% 100% 
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0. No College (n=277) 15.20% 24.90% 35.40% 24.50% 100% 
      
Responses from survey question #3: How knowledgeable are you about the laws in the United States that deal with the 
protection of personal information in government departments? 
Knowledge of laws: Government 
Departments 
Total Sample Percentages: (n=521) 
15.93% 46.07% 30.52% 7.49% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 13.50% 55.80% 22.10% 8.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 21.90% 43.80% 28.60% 5.70% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 21.20% 47.10% 27.90% 3.80% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 10.60% 36.50% 44.20% 8.70% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 12.50% 47.10% 29.80% 10.60% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 20.80% 42.30% 29.80% 7.10% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 13.60% 47.90% 30.90% 7.60% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  17.20% 46.70% 31.10% 4.90% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 14.80% 45.50% 30.00% 9.70% 100% 
 
Responses from survey question #4: How knowledgeable are you about the laws in the United States that deal with the 
protection of personal information in private companies? 
Knowledge of laws: Private 
Companies 
Total Sample Percentages: (n=521) 
16.12% 44.53% 29.94% 9.40% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 16.30% 46.20% 26.90% 10.60% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 22.90% 47.60% 24.80% 4.80% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 22.10% 46.20% 23.10% 8.70% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 10.60% 36.50% 41.30% 11.50% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 8.70% 46.20% 33.70% 11.50% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 17.90% 47.00% 26.80% 8.30% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 15.30% 43.30% 31.40% 9.90% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  17.20% 43.00% 32.40% 7.40% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 15.20% 45.80% 27.80% 11.20% 100% 
 
Responses from survey question #5: How knowledgeable are you about the creation of 1) Department of Homeland Security, 
2) Fusion Centers, and 3) The United States Patriot Act of 2001? 
Department of Homeland Security 
Total Sample Percentages: (n=521) 22.46% 44.72% 25.14% 7.68% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 22.10% 45.20% 26.00% 6.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 26.70% 48.60% 18.10% 6.70% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 23.10% 43.30% 26.00% 7.70% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 19.20% 39.40% 32.70% 8.70% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 21.20% 47.10% 23.10% 8.70% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 31.50% 43.60% 19.60% 5.40% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 18.10% 45.30% 27.80% 8.80% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  26.20% 43.90% 25.80% 4.10% 100% 
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0. No College (n=277) 19.10% 45.50% 24.50% 10.80% 100% 
Fusion Centers 
Total Sample Percentages: (n=521) 8.83% 18.43% 41.65% 31.09% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 12.50% 16.30% 38.50% 32.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 8.60% 28.60% 39.00% 23.80% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 10.60% 22.10% 42.30% 25.00% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 3.80% 13.50% 49.00% 33.70% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 8.70% 11.50% 39.50% 40.40% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 9.50% 23.20% 40.50% 26.80% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 8.50% 16.10% 42.20% 33.10% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  9.80% 17.60% 42.60% 29.90% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 7.90% 19.10% 40.80% 32.10% 100% 
      
The United States Patriot Act 
Total Sample Percentages: (n=521) 16.51% 38.58% 29.94% 14.97% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 14.40% 46.20% 26.90% 12.50% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 15.20% 40.00% 28.60% 16.20% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 23.10% 30.80% 31.70% 14.40% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 9.60% 36.50% 35.60% 18.30% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 20.20% 39.40% 26.90% 13.50% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 23.80% 38.75% 28.60% 8.90% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 13.00% 38.50% 30.60% 17.80% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  18.90% 41.80% 28.30% 11.10% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 14.40% 35.70% 31.40% 18.40% 100% 
 
Univariate Statistics: 
Effectiveness of Privacy Laws 
 
Responses from survey question #10: To what extent do you believe that the Fourth Amendment is effective at protecting 
society from unreasonable searches and seizures? 
Effectiveness of Laws Very Effective 
Somewhat 
Effective 
Not Very 
Effective 
Not Effective 
At All Not Sure Total 
The Fourth Amendment 
Total Sample Percentages: (n=334) 17.96% 48.20% 25.45% 6.29% 2.10% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=58) 15.50% 53.40% 25.90% 5.20% 0.00% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=63) 22.20% 54.00% 19.00% 3.20% 1.60% 100% 
3. African American (n=72) 23.60% 43.10% 25.00% 4.20% 4.20% 100% 
4. Asians (n=63) 19.00% 52.40% 20.60% 4.80% 3.20% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=78) 10.30% 41.00% 34.60% 12.80% 1.30% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=113) 18.60% 48.70% 23.90% 7.10% 1.80% 100% 
0. Females (n=221) 17.60% 48.00% 26.20% 5.90% 2.30% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=158) 17.70% 47.50% 27.80% 5.70% 1.30% 100% 
0. No College (n=176) 18.20% 48.90% 23.30% 6.80% 2.80% 100% 
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Responses from survey question #6: To what extent do you believe laws are effective at protecting your personal information 
that is held by private companies?  
Protection of Personal 
Information in Private Companies 
Total Sample Percentages: (n=521) 
13.05% 39.54% 31.09% 10.94% 5.37% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 10.60% 42.30% 34.60% 12.50% 0.00% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 11.40% 47.60% 32.40% 5.70% 2.90% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 27.90% 31.70% 24.00% 5.80% 10.60% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 8.70% 45.20% 28.80% 11.50% 5.80% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races 
(n=104) 6.70% 30.80% 35.60% 19.20% 7.70% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 11.90% 40.50% 31.00% 12.50% 4.20% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 13.60% 39.10% 31.20% 10.20% 5.90% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  11.50% 40.20% 28.30% 13.90% 6.10% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 14.40% 39.00% 33.60% 8.30% 4.70% 100% 
 
Responses from survey question #7: To what extent do you believe laws are effective at protecting your personal information 
that is held by government departments? 
Protection of Personal 
Information in Government 
Departments 
Total Sample Percentages: (n=521) 
15.74% 44.15% 25.14% 10.36% 4.61% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 15.40% 47.10% 26.00% 11.50% 0.00% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 15.20% 52.40% 20.00% 8.60% 3.80% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 19.20% 43.30% 24.00% 3.80% 9.60% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 13.50% 47.10% 25.00% 9.60% 4.80% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races 
(n=104) 15.40% 30.80% 30.80% 18.30% 4.80% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 19.00% 39.30% 26.20% 11.90% 3.60% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 14.20% 46.50% 24.60% 9.60% 5.10% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  15.20% 43.90% 24.60% 12.70% 3.70% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 16.20% 44.40% 25.60% 8.30% 5.40% 100% 
 
Univariate Statistics:  
Acceptability of Data Sharing: Government and Private Agencies  
 
Responses from survey question #24: To what extent is it appropriate for a government agency to share citizen’s personal 
information with third parties, such as other government agencies, foreign governments, and the private sector? 
Sharing of Personal 
Information 
Yes, it’s the 
government’s 
right under all 
circumstances 
Yes, if the 
citizen is 
suspected of 
wrong-
doing 
Yes, as long as 
the government 
expressed 
consent of the 
citizen 
No, under no 
circumstances 
should the 
government share 
information about 
citizens 
Not 
Sure 
 
Total 
 
Other Government 
Agencies 
Total Sample 
Percentages (n=521) 
12.86% 33.97% 18.81% 23.42% 10.92% 100% 
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Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 18.30% 29.80% 14.40% 29.80% 7.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 14.30% 29.50% 22.90% 22.90% 10.50% 100% 
3. African American 
(n=104) 18.30% 33.70% 15.40% 22.10% 10.60% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 4.80% 44.20% 17.30% 17.30% 16.30% 100% 
5. Other/Two or 
More Races (n=104) 8.70% 32.70% 24.00% 25.00% 9.60% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 15.50% 35.70% 18.50% 20.20% 10.10% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 11.60% 33.10% 19.00% 24.90% 11.30% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  13.50% 35.20% 19.30% 23.00% 9.00% 100% 
0. No College 
(n=277) 12.30% 32.90% 18.40% 23.80% 12.60% 100% 
       
Foreign 
Governments 
Total Sample 
Percentages (n=521) 
9.21% 29.37% 14.01% 35.32% 12.09% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 12.50% 31.70% 7.70% 38.50% 9.60% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 11.40% 30.50% 12.40% 30.50% 15.20% 100% 
3. African American 
(n=104) 13.50% 29.80% 9.60% 36.50% 10.60% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 3.80% 29.80% 24.00% 26.00% 16.30% 100% 
5. Other/Two or 
More Races (n=104) 4.80% 25.00% 16.30% 45.20% 8.70% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 11.30% 29.20% 14.30% 34.50% 10.70% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 8.20% 29.50% 13.90% 35.70% 12.70% 100% 
       
Education: 1. College 
(n=244)  9.40% 26.60% 14.80% 38.50% 10.70% 100% 
0. No College 
(n=277) 9.00% 31.80% 13.40% 32.50% 13.40% 100% 
       
Private Sector 
Agencies 
Total Sample 
Percentages (n=521) 
8.06% 22.84% 19.77% 35.51% 13.82% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 10.60% 26.00% 14.40% 40.40% 8.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 8.60% 24.80% 21.00% 25.70% 20.00% 100% 
3. African American 
(n=104) 12.50% 21.20% 19.20% 32.70% 14.40% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 1.00% 27.90% 24.00% 31.75% 15.40% 100% 
5. Other/Two or 
More Races (n=104) 7.70% 14.40% 20.20% 47.10% 10.60% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 11.90% 22.60% 23.80% 31.50% 10.10% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 6.20% 22.90% 17.80% 37.40% 15.60% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  8.20% 20.90% 20.90% 38.10% 11.90% 100% 
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0. No College 
(n=277) 7.90% 24.50% 18.80% 33.20% 15.50% 100% 
       
Responses from survey question #27: To what extent is it appropriate for a private agency to share citizen’s personal information 
with third parties, such as the national government, foreign government, and other private sector organizations? 
Sharing of Personal 
Information 
Yes, it’s the 
organization’s 
right under all 
circumstances 
Yes, if the 
customer is 
suspected of 
wrong-
doing 
Yes, as long as 
the organization 
has expressed 
the consent of 
the customer 
No, under no 
circumstances 
should the 
organization share 
information about 
their customers 
Not 
Sure 
Total 
n = 521 
Other Private 
Sector 
Organizations 
Total Sample 
Percentages (n=521) 
7.68% 20.92% 22.07% 36.28% 13.05% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 8.70% 30.80% 17.30% 36.50% 6.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 6.70% 31.40% 20.00% 25.70% 16.20% 100% 
3. African American 
(n=104) 12.50% 15.40% 20.20% 35.60% 16.30% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 4.80% 15.40% 30.80% 32.70% 16.30% 100% 
5. Other/Two or 
More Races (n=104) 5.80% 11.50% 22.10% 51.00% 9.60% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 10.70% 24.40% 22.60% 32.10% 10.10% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 6.20% 19.30% 21.80% 38.20% 14.40% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  7.80% 18.00% 22.50% 39.80% 11.90%  100% 
0. No College 
(n=277) 7.60% 23.50% 21.70% 33.20% 14.10% 100% 
 
National 
Government  
Total Sample 
Percentages (n=521) 
13.05% 29.75% 18.62% 26.49% 12.09% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 15.40% 33.70% 15.40% 28.80% 6.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 13.30% 34.30% 17.10% 21.00% 14.30% 100% 
3. African American 
(n=104) 19.20% 26.00% 15.40% 24.00% 15.40% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 7.70% 30.80% 20.20% 25.00% 16.30% 100% 
5. Other/Two or 
More Races (n=104) 9.60% 24.00% 25.00% 33.70% 7.70% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 15.50% 30.40% 19.60% 23.80% 10.70% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 11.90% 29.50% 18.10% 27.80% 12.70% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  13.10% 30.30% 16.40% 29.10% 11.10% 100% 
0. No College 
(n=277) 13.00% 29.20% 20.60% 24.20% 13.00% 100% 
       
Foreign 
Government 
Total Sample 
Percentages (n=521) 
7.29% 21.31% 15.16% 42.99% 13.24% 100% 
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Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 11.50% 23.10% 13.50% 46.20% 5.80% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 6.70% 30.50% 14.30% 35.20% 13.30% 100% 
3. African American 
(n=104) 8.70% 15.40% 15.40% 41.30% 19.20% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 3.80% 24.00% 18.30% 36.50% 17.30% 100% 
5. Other/Two or 
More Races (n=104) 5.80% 13.50% 14.40% 55.80% 10.60% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 8.30% 24.40% 15.50% 41.10% 10.70% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 6.80% 19.80% 15.00% 43.90% 14.40% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  5.70% 21.70% 16.40% 44.70% 11.50% 100% 
0. No College 
(n=277) 8.70% 20.90% 14.10% 41.50% 14.80% 100% 
 
Responses from survey question #25: Many businesses create profiles about their customers that include information about 
purchasing habits, personal characteristics, and credit history. How acceptable to you would it be for a business to use 
information from your customer profile to inform you of products or services that they think would be of interest to you? 
Acceptability of 
Data Mining 
Very 
Acceptable 
Somewhat 
Acceptable 
Not Really 
Acceptable 
Not Acceptable At 
All 
Not 
Sure Total 
Private Companies  
Total Sample 
Percentages (n=521) 
13.63% 37.43% 28.98% 11.09% 8.06% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 14.40% 35.60% 31.70% 14.40% 3.80% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 13.30% 41.00% 29.50% 5.70% 10.50% 100% 
3. African American 
(n=104) 21.20% 35.60% 28.80% 7.70% 6.70% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 9.60% 36.50% 28.80% 12.50% 12.50% 100% 
5. Other/Two or 
More Races (n=104) 9.60% 38.50% 26.00% 19.20% 6.70% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 11.30% 45.80% 24.40% 12.50% 6.00% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 14.70% 33.40% 31.20% 11.60% 9.10% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  11.50% 39.30% 29.50% 13.10% 6.60% 100% 
0. No College 
(n=277) 15.50% 35.70% 28.50% 10.80% 9.40% 100% 
 
Univariate Statistics 
Trust in Government and Private Agencies  
 
Responses from survey question #11: When it comes to privacy of personal information, what level of trust do you have that the 
United States government is striking the right balance between national security and individual rights? 
Levels of Trust 
Total Sample Percentages 
(n=521) 
Very High 
Level of 
Trust 
Reasonably 
High Level of 
Trust 
Fairly Low 
Level of 
Trust 
Very Low Level 
of Trust 
Not 
Sure 
Total  
n = 521 
The Government 9.60% 28.41% 35.70% 19.66% 6.33% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 10.60% 33.70% 31.70% 22.10% 1.90% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 10.50% 34.30% 30.50% 19.00% 5.70% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 15.40% 22.10% 35.60% 14.40% 12.50% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 4.80% 36.50% 40.40% 11.50% 6.70% 100% 
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5. Other/Two or More Races 
(n=104) 6.70% 15.40% 40.40% 32.70% 4.80% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 10.10% 29.80% 29.80% 26.80% 3.60% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 9.30% 27.80% 38.50% 16.70% 7.60% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  9.00% 27.50% 34.40% 23.40% 5.70% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 10.10% 29.20% 36.80% 17.00% 6.90% 100% 
 
Responses from survey question #12: What level of trust do you have that private companies, such as banks, credit card companies, 
and places where you shop, will protect your personal information? 
Private Companies  
Total Sample Percentages 
(n=521) 
10.75% 33.97% 32.82% 17.66% 4.80% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 10.60% 35.60% 32.70% 19.20% 1.90% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 16.20% 39.00% 31.40% 11.40% 1.90% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 15.40% 33.70% 27.90% 14.40% 8.70% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 5.80% 32.70% 35.60% 19.20% 6.70% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races 
(n=104) 5.80% 28.80% 36.50% 24.00% 4.80% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 11.90% 30.40% 35.10% 19.60% 3.00% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 10.20% 35.70% 31.70% 16.70% 5.70% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  9.80% 32.80% 31.10% 21.70% 4.50% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 11.60% 35.00% 34.30% 14.10% 5.10% 100% 
 
Responses for survey question #15: When it comes to privacy, how worried are you about providing your personal information on 
websites, such as your name, address, date of birth, gender? 
Level of Concern  
 
Very 
Worried 
Somewhat 
Worried 
Not Very 
Worried Not Sure Total 
Concern Over Providing 
Personal Data to Online 
Platforms  
Total Sample Percentages 
(n=521) 
29.94% 50.29% 16.31 3.45% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 22.10% 54.80% 20.20% 2.90% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 36.20% 49.50% 11.40% 2.90% 1000% 
3. African American (n=104) 27.90% 45.20% 21.20% 5.80% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 32.70% 51.90% 12.50% 2.90% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races 
(n=104) 30.80% 50.00% 16.30% 2.90% 100%  
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 27.40% 54.80% 16.10% 1.80% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 31.20% 48.20% 16.40% 4.20% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  30.70% 47.10% 18.40% 3.70% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 29.20% 53.10% 14.40% 3.20% 100% 
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Univariate Statistics: 
Support for Government and Private Agencies Dataveillance Abilities 
 
Responses from survey question #26: Please indicate if you support or oppose, moderately or strongly, companies who service you are 
using being able to do each of the following: 
Support for Private Agencies 
Total Sample Percentages (n=521) 
Support 
Strongly 
Support 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Strongly Total 
Scan the text of your email messages for 
information on your interests 9.21% 15.16% 23.80% 51.82% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 10.60% 15.40% 25.00% 49.00% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 7.60% 18.10% 24.80% 49.50% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 14.40% 16.30% 25.00% 44.20% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 5.80% 20.20% 28.80% 45.20% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 7.70% 5.80% 15.40% 71.20% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 9.50% 18.50% 27.40% 44.60% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 9.10% 13.60% 22.10% 55.20% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  8.60% 13.90% 23.00% 54.50% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 9.70% 16.20% 24.50% 49.50% 100% 
 
Track the content of your internet searches 8.64% 16.12% 25.53% 49.71% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 6.70% 19.20% 24.00% 50.00% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 8.60% 14.30% 26.70% 50.50% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 15.40% 16.30% 24.00% 44.20% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 5.80% 25.00% 26.80% 40.40% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 6.70% 5.80% 24.00% 63.50% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 9.50% 19.00% 29.20% 42.30% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 8.20% 14.70% 23.80% 53.30% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  7.40% 20.10% 23.00% 49.60% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 9.70% 12.60% 27.80% 49.80% 100% 
 
Share information on the contents of your 
social media (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 9.21% 14.40% 24.57% 51.82% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 11.50% 17.30% 21.20% 50.00% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 9.50% 12.40% 22.90% 55.20% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 13.50% 16.30% 24.00% 46.20% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 4.80% 17.30% 29.80% 48.10% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 6.70% 8.70% 25.00% 59.60% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 9.50% 14.90% 31.50% 44.00% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 9.10% 14.20% 21.20% 55.50% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  9.40% 14.30% 24.20% 52.00% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 9.00% 14.40% 24.90% 51.60% 100% 
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Share information on the contents of your 
social media (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 9.79% 14.78% 23.03% 52.40% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 11.50% 16.30% 18.30% 53.80% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 9.50% 14.30% 21.90% 54.30% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 13.50% 20.20% 21.20% 45.20% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 8.70% 15.40% 27.90% 48.10% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 5.80% 7.70% 26.00% 60.60% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 10.70% 16.70% 28.60% 44.00% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 9.30% 13.90% 20.40% 56.40% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  11.10% 14.80% 22.10% 52.00% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 8.70% 14.80% 23.80% 52.70% 100% 
 
Track your credit card purchases 9.60% 15.16% 19.77% 55.47% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 10.60% 20.20% 14.40% 54.80% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 10.50% 18.18% 15.20% 56.20% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 13.50% 12.50% 21.20% 52.90% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 7.70% 14.40% 33.70% 44.20% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 5.80% 10.60% 14.40% 69.20% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 11.30% 16.70% 26.20% 45.80% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 8.80% 14.40% 16.70% 60.10% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  9.00% 15.60% 21.30% 54.10% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 10.10% 14.80% 18.40% 56.70% 100% 
 
Track your whereabouts using GPS signal 
from your phone  8.25% 13.63% 21.31% 56.81% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 9.60% 14.40% 17.30% 58.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 7.60% 18.10% 22.90% 51.40% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 12.50% 14.40% 21.20% 51.90% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 4.80% 17.30% 27.90% 50.00% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 6.70% 3.80% 17.30% 72.10% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 8.90% 15.50% 29.20% 46.40% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 7.90% 12.70% 17.60% 61.80% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  7.40% 12.70% 22.50% 57.40% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 9.00% 14.40% 20.20% 56.30% 100% 
 
 
Responses from survey question #23: Please indicate if you support or oppose, moderately or strongly police or intelligence agencies 
being able to do each of these things with a court order: 
Support for Government Agencies Support Strongly 
Support 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Strongly Total 
Scan the text of your email messages for 
information on your interests 
Total Sample Percentages (n=521) 
15.36% 27.06% 24.76% 32.82% 100% 
Race:  14.40% 29.80% 26.00% 29.80% 100% 
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1. Whites (n=104) 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 15.20% 30.50% 22.90% 31.40% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 23.10% 22.10% 25.00% 29.89% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 11.50% 26.90% 35.60% 26.00% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 12.50% 26.00% 14.40% 47.10% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 17.30% 30.40% 26.20% 26.20% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 14.40% 25.50% 24.10% 36.00% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  16.00% 25.80% 25.00% 33.20% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 14.80% 28.20% 24.50% 32.50% 100% 
      
Track the content of your internet searches 13.82% 26.49% 28.21% 31.48% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 11.50% 29.80% 28.80% 29.80% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 16.20% 29.50% 26.70% 27.60% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 21.20% 24.00% 26.00% 28.80% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 8.70% 29.80% 30.80% 30.80% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 11.50% 19.20% 28.80% 40.40% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 14.90% 30.40% 26.20% 28.60% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 13.30% 24.60% 29.20% 32.90% 100% 
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  13.50% 25.80% 27.50% 33.20% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 14.10% 27.10% 28.90% 30.00% 100% 
      
Obtain information from website visits 12.67% 26.49% 28.60% 32.25% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 10.60% 30.80% 29.80% 28.80% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 13.30% 34.30% 25.70% 26.70% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 20.20% 22.10% 25.00% 32.70% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 8.70% 26.90% 31.70% 32.70% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 10.60% 18.30% 30.890% 40.40% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 11.90% 26.20% 27.20% 33.10% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 13.00% 26.90% 27.20% 33.10% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  13.10% 25.40% 26.60% 34.80% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 12.30% 27.40% 30.30% 30.00% 100% 
Obtain information on the contents of your 
social media (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) 14.97% 25.41% 26.49% 33.40% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 18.30% 26.90% 26.00% 28.80% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 18.10% 22.90% 26.70% 32.40% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 19.20% 23.10% 27.90% 29.80% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 11.50% 26.00% 28.80% 33.70% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 7.70% 26.90% 23.10% 42.30% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 13.70% 25.60% 28.60% 32.10% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 15.60% 24.90% 25.50% 34.00% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  16.00% 25.80% 23.80% 34.40% 100% 
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0. No College (n=277) 14.10% 24.50% 28.90% 32.50% 100% 
      
Track your credit card purchase 13.05% 23.22% 25.14% 38.58% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 13.50% 23.10% 30.80% 32.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 17.10% 31.40% 18.10% 33.30% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 16.30% 16.30% 30.80% 36.50% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 5.80% 26.90% 28.80% 38.50% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 12.50% 18.30% 17.30% 51.90% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 14.30% 25.00% 23.20% 37.50% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 12.50% 22.40% 26.10% 39.10% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  13.50% 23.00% 22.50% 41.00% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 12.60% 23.50% 27.40% 36.50% 100% 
Track your whereabouts using the GPS signal 
from your phone 11.71% 25.14% 22.07% 41.07% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 9.60% 26.00% 24.00% 40.40% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 14.30% 28.60% 22.90% 34.30% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 16.30% 25.00% 24.00% 34.60% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 8.70% 28.80% 23.10% 39.40% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 9.60% 17.30% 16.30% 56.70% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 11.30% 24.40% 26.20% 38.10% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 11.90% 25.50% 20.10% 42.50% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  11.50% 25.00% 22.10% 41.40% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 11.90% 25.30% 22.00% 40.80% 100% 
 
Univariate Statistics 
Intrusiveness of Laws and Control Over Personal Information: 
 
Responses for survey question #19: The United States government has enacted laws aimed at protecting national security. To what 
extent do you believe laws aimed at protecting national security are intrusive upon personal privacy? 
Intrusiveness of Laws Highly Intrusive 
Somewhat 
Intrusive 
Not Very 
Intrusive 
Not Very 
Intrusive at all 
Not 
Sure 
Total 
n = 521 
Government Laws 15.74% 51.44% 16.51% 2.69% 13.63% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 19.20% 55.80% 13.50% 4.80% 6.70% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 17.10% 44.80% 19.00% 2.90% 16.20% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 15.40% 53.80% 14.40% 0.00% 16.30% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 7.70% 56.70% 19.20% 1.00% 15.40% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 19.20% 46.20% 16.30% 4.80% 13.50% 100% 
       
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 19.00% 56.50% 13.10% 1.80% 9.50% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 14.20% 49.00% 18.10% 3.10% 15.60% 100% 
       
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  17.20% 54.10% 17.20% 1.60% 9.80% 100% 
0. No College (n=277) 14.40% 49.10% 15.90% 3.60% 17.00% 100% 
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Responses from survey question #8: To what extent do you have control in what happens to your personal information? 
Control Over Personal Data Complete Control 
A lot of 
Control 
Some 
Control No Control Total 
 13.82% 25.91% 42.80% 30.52% 100% 
Race:  
1. Whites (n=104) 11.50% 25.00% 47.10% 16.30% 100% 
2. Hispanics (n=105) 19.00% 34.30% 34.30% 12.40% 100% 
3. African American (n=104) 20.20% 25.00% 38.50% 16.30% 100% 
4. Asians (n=104) 7.70% 25.00% 51.90% 15.40% 100% 
5. Other/Two or More Races (n=104) 10.60% 20.20% 42.30% 26.90% 100% 
      
Gender:  
1. Males (n=168) 16.70% 22.00% 40.50% 20.80% 100% 
0. Females (n=353) 12.50% 27.80% 43.90% 15.90% 100% 
      
Education:  
1. College (n=244)  11.90% 28.30% 41.00% 18.90% 100%  
0. No College (n=277) 15.50% 23.80% 44.40% 16.20% 100% 
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APPENDIX B: 
Bivariate Statistics of Correlates for Acceptability, Support, and Trust in Government and Private Agencies Data Mining and 
Data Sharing Abilities after 9/11 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Description 
 
 
n 
 
 
Mean 
Or 
Percent 
 
Acceptability  
of Data Sharing 
Government 
Agencies 
 
Acceptability 
of Data 
Sharing 
Private 
Agencies 
Support for 
Data 
Mining 
Government 
Agencies 
Support for 
Data 
Mining 
Private 
Agencies 
Trust in 
Government 
Agencies 
Trust in 
Private 
Agencies 
Knowledge of 
Surveillance 
Technology 
Average rating for 6 items 521 2.15 
 
     
Knowledge of 
Laws and Agencies 
Created After 9/11 
Average rating for 5 items 521 2.43 
  
 
 
   
Effectiveness of 
Privacy Laws 
Average rating for 3 items 521 2.47       
Intrusiveness of 
National Security 
Laws 
Average rating for 1 item 521 2.47 
 
 
 
   
Race White 104 19.96% 2.96 2.97* 2.78** 3.15** 2.71** 2.66** 
 Hispanic 105 20.15% 3.05 3.06* 2.70** 3.19** 2.75** 2.44** 
 Black 104 19.96% 2.96 3.21* 2.71** 3.03** 2.87** 2.67** 
 Asian 104 19.96% 3.16 3.30* 2.87** 3.15** 2.75** 2.88** 
 Two or More Races/Other 104 19.96% 3.20 3.34* 3.04** 3.45** 3.13** 2.93** 
Gender Female 353 67.75%   3.13* 3.24** 2.84 3.25** 2.86 2.72 
 Male 168 32.25%  2.94* 3.03** 2.77 3.07** 2.84 2.71 
Education No College Degree 277 53.17% 3.08 3.16 2.81 3.19 2.81 2.66 
 College Degree 244 46.83% 3.05 3.19 2.83 3.20 2.89 2.78 
Age Age  ≤ 34 277 53.17% 2.98* 3.08* 2.71** 3.03** 2.76** 2.60** 
 Age ≥ 34 244 46.83%   3.16* 3.28* 2.93** 3.38** 2.95** 2.85** 
Religion No Religion 122 23.42% 3.19 3.27 2.95* 3.38** 3.11** 2.94** 
 Religion 399 76.58% 3.03 3.15 2.78* 3.14** 2.77** 2.65** 
Income Annual Income ≤ $50,000 310 59.50%    3.16** 3.26* 2.80 3.19 2.86 2.76 
 Annual Income ≥ $50,000 211 40.50%   2.93** 3.06* 2.82 3.20 2.84 2.66 
Note: **Overall differences between the categories are statistically significant at p < .05, * p <.10.
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APPENDIX C: Survey Comparisons 2006 & 2012 to 2017 
Knowledge of Surveillance Technology and Laws Protecting 
Personal Information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of Government and Private Agencies Laws  
 
Year of Survey Effectiveness of Laws Very Effective Somewhat Effective Total 
2006 Protection of Personal 
Information Private 
Companies 
7.0% 44.1% 51.1% 
2017 13.0% 39.5% 52.5% 
2006 Protection of Personal 
Information 
Government Agencies 
8.2% 43.3% 51.5% 
2017 15.7% 44.1% 59.8% 
 
 
Intrusiveness of National Security Laws  
 
 
Year Intrusiveness of 
Laws 
Highly 
Intrusive 
Somewhat 
Intrusive 
Not Very 
Intrusive 
Not Very 
Intrusive at 
all 
Not 
Sure 
 
Total 
 
2006 
Government Laws 
15.1% 42.2% 18.2% 8.4% 0.0% 100% 
2017 15.7% 51.4% 16.5% 2.6% 13.6% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of Survey Knowledge of Surveillance Technology 
Very 
Knowledgeable 
Somewhat 
Knowledgeable Total 
2006 
The Internet 
39.2% 41.3% 80.5% 
2017 69.9% 29.9% 99.8% 
2006 
GPS 
15.0% 44.6% 59.7% 
2017 31.8% 45.8% 77.6% 
2006 RFID 8.3% 29.7% 38.1% 2017 16.5% 29.3% 45.8% 
2006 CCTV 10.3% 37.0% 47.3% 2017 22.6% 34.7% 57.3% 
2006 Biometrics 5.1% 24.2% 29.3% 2017 16.7% 29.7% 46.4% 
2006 Data Mining 11.6% 30.3% 41.9% 2017 17.4% 28.6% 46.0% 
2006 Government Laws 8.6% 45.1% 53.7% 2017 15.9% 46.0% 61.9% 
2006 Privacy Laws 6.5% 45.2% 51.7% 2017 16.1% 44.5% 60.6% 
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Acceptability of Data Sharing:  
Government and Private Agencies Comparisons 
 
Government Agencies 
 
Year of 
Survey 
Sharing of 
Personal 
Information 
Yes, it’s the 
government’s 
right under all 
circumstances 
Yes, if the 
citizen is 
suspected of 
wrong-
doing 
Yes, as long 
as the 
government 
expressed 
consent of 
the citizen 
No, under no 
circumstances 
should the 
government 
share 
information 
about citizens 
Not Sure 
 
Total 
 
 
2006 Other 
Government 
Agencies 
10.7% 37.6% 20.2% 17.5% 0.0% 100% 
 
2017 12.8% 33.9% 18.8% 23.4% 10.9% 100% 
 
2006 Foreign 
Governments 
4.8% 30.2% 16.7% 34.1% 0.0% 100% 
 
2017 9.2% 29.3% 14.0% 35.3% 12.0% 100% 
 
2006 Private 
Sector 
Agencies 
2.8% 21.5% 22.4% 39.3% 0.0% 100% 
 
2017 8.0% 22.8% 19.7% 35.5% 13.82% 100% 
Private Agencies 
Year of 
Survey 
Sharing of 
Personal 
Information 
Yes, it’s the 
organization’s 
right under all 
circumstances 
Yes, if the 
customer is 
suspected of 
wrong-
doing 
Yes, as long 
as the 
organization 
has 
expressed the 
consent of 
the customer 
No, under no 
circumstances 
should the 
organization 
share 
information 
about their 
customers 
Not Sure 
 
Total 
 
 
2006 National 
Government 
5.6% 35.1% 25.1% 34.2% 0.0% 100% 
 
2017 13.0% 29.7% 18.6% 26.4% 12.0% 100% 
 
2006 Other Private Sector 
Organizations 
2.1% 13.5% 31.3% 53.1% 0.0% 100% 
 
2017 7.6% 20.9% 22.0% 36.2% 13.0% 100% 
 
2006 Foreign 
Government 
1.7% 21.8% 21.5% 55.0% 0.0% 100% 
 
2017 7.2% 21.3% 15.1% 42.9% 13.2% 100% 
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Support in Government and Private Agencies Data Mining Capabilities  
 
 
Year Support for Private Agencies Support Strongly 
Support 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Strongly 
 
Total 
 
 
2012 
 Scan the text of your email messages for 
information on your interests 
4.0% 8.0% 22.0% 67.0% 100% 
 
2017 
 
9.2% 15.1% 23.8% 51.8% 100% 
 
2012 Track the content of your internet 
searches 
5.0% 16.0% 29.0% 51.0% 100% 
 
2017 8.6% 16.1% 25.5% 49.7% 100% 
 
2012 Share information from your website 
visits 
6.0% 16.0% 28.0% 50.0% 100% 
 
2017 9.2% 14.4% 24.5% 51.8% 100% 
 
2012 Share information on the contents of 
your social media (i.e. Facebook, 
Twitter, etc.) 
6.0% 15.0% 25.0% 54.0% 100% 
 
2017 9.7% 14.7% 23.0% 52.4% 100% 
 
Year Support for Government Agencies 
Support 
Strongly 
Support 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Moderately 
Oppose 
Strongly Total 
 
2012 Scan the text of your email messages for 
information on your interests 
11.0% 20.0% 23.0% 46.0% 100% 
 
2017 15.36% 27.06% 24.76% 32.82% 100% 
 
2012 Track the content of your internet 
searches 
14.0% 23.0% 26.0% 38.0% 100% 
 
2017 13.82% 26.49% 28.21% 31.48% 100% 
 
2012 Obtain information from website visits 
13.0% 25.0% 27.0% 36.0% 100% 
 
2017 12.67% 26.49% 28.60% 32.25% 100% 
 
2012 Obtain information on the contents of your social media (i.e. Facebook, 
Twitter, etc.) 
14.0% 25.0% 26.0% 36.0% 100% 
 
2017 14.9% 25.4% 26.4% 33.4% 100% 
 
 
Trust in Government and Private Agencies 
  
   
   
  
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
Year of 
Survey 
Levels of Trust Very High Level of Trust 
Reasonably 
High Level of 
Trust 
 
Total 
2006 
The Government 
9.9% 28.6% 38.5% 
2017 9.6% 28.4% 38.0% 
2006 
Private Agencies 
5.8% 43.5% 49.3% 
2017 10.7% 33.9% 44.6% 
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APPENDIX D: Survey Questionnaire 
 
Welcome to our survey on Societal Opinion on Government and Private Agencies Surveillance 
Capabilities Post 9/11! 
Investigator(s) Dr. Emily Troshynski, Ph.D. & Stephanie Kaplan, B.A. 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate your opinions about the ability of both government and 
private corporations to engage in surveillance practices within the United States. You are being 
asked to participate in the study because you meet the demographic criteria needed to fulfill 
specific categories.  If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to read and 
respond to the following questions. 
The study will take 15 minutes of your time. You will be compensated for your time. 
 
For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, any complaints or comments regarding 
the manner in which the study is being conducted you may contact the UNLV Office of Research 
Integrity – Human Subjects at 702-895-2794, toll free at 877-895-2794, or via email at 
IRB@unlv.edu.   
 
For specific questions about the survey please contact Stephanie Kaplan at 702-895-0207.    
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw at any time. 
 
 
Participant Consent:  By clicking the bottom right arrow I certify that I am at least 18 years of 
age and that I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study.  
 
 
 
1) Which of the following categories best describes your ethnicity/race?  (If the Other/Two or 
More Races category is selected please define specifically which ethnicities best encompass your 
racial identity in the box directly next to the category).  
m White (Non-Hispanic) (1) 
m Hispanic (2) 
m African American (3) 
m Asian (4) 
m Other/Two or More Races (5) ____________________ 
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2) To start, we would like to know how knowledgeable you are about each of the following?   
 
 Very knowledgeable (1) 
Somewhat 
knowledgeable 
(2) 
Not very 
knowledgeable 
(3) 
Not all 
knowledgeable 
(4) 
The Internet (5) m  m  m  m  
Global 
Positioning 
Systems (GPS) 
(7) 
m  m  m  m  
Radio Frequency 
Identification 
(RFID) tags on 
consumer 
products (10) 
m  m  m  m  
Closed Circuit 
Television 
(CCTV) in public 
spaces (11) 
m  m  m  m  
Biometrics for 
facial recognition 
(12) 
m  m  m  m  
Data mining of 
personal 
information (13) 
m  m  m  m  
 
 
3) How knowledgeable are you about the laws in the United States that deal with the protection 
of personal information in government departments? 
m Very knowledgeable (1) 
m Somewhat knowledgeable (2) 
m Not very knowledgeable (3) 
m Not at all knowledgeable (4) 
 
4) How knowledgeable are you about the laws in the United States that deal with the protection 
of personal information in private companies? 
m Very knowledgeable (1) 
m Somewhat knowledgeable (2) 
m Not very knowledgeable (3) 
m Not at all knowledgeable (4) 
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5) How knowledgeable are you about the creation of the following: 
 
 
Very 
Knowledgeable 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Knowledgeable 
(2) 
Not 
Knowledgeable 
(3) 
Not At All 
Knowledgeable 
(4) 
The Department 
of Homeland 
Security? (1) 
m  m  m  m  
Fusion Centers? 
(2) m  m  m  m  
The United States 
Patriot Act of 
2001? (3) 
m  m  m  m  
 
 
6) To what extent do you believe laws are effective at protecting your personal information that 
is held by government departments? Do you believe the laws are: 
m Very effective (1) 
m Somewhat effective (2) 
m Not very effective (3) 
m Not effective at all (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
 
7) To what extent do you believe laws are effective at protecting your personal information that 
is held by private companies? Do you believe the laws are: 
m Very effective (1) 
m Somewhat effective (2) 
m Not very effective (3) 
m Not effective at all (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
 
8) To what extent do you have control in what happens to your personal information?   Would 
you say you have: 
m Complete control (1) 
m A lot of control (2) 
m Some control (3) 
m No control (4) 
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9) Do you know what the Fourth Amendment is? 
m Yes (1) 
m No (2) 
 
Display This Question: 
Do you know what the Fourth Amendment is? If Yes Is Selected, proceed to the following 
question. 
10) To what extent do you believe that the Fourth Amendment is effective at protecting society 
from unreasonable searches and seizures?  
m Very effective (1) 
m Somewhat effective (2) 
m Not very effective (3) 
m Not effective at all (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
 
11) When it comes to privacy of personal information, what level of trust do you have that the 
United States government is striking the right balance between national security and individual 
rights?  
m Very high level of trust (1) 
m Reasonably high level of trust (2) 
m Fairly low level of trust (3) 
m Very low level of trust (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
 
12) What level of trust do you have that private companies, such as banks, credit card companies 
and places where you shop, will protect your personal information?  
m Very high level of trust (1) 
m Reasonably high level of trust (2) 
m Fairly low level of trust (3) 
m Very low level of trust (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
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13) Have you ever done the following for the purpose of protecting your personal information? 
Check all that apply: 
q Refused to give information to a business because you thought it was not needed? (1) 
q Refused to give information to a government agency because you thought it was not needed? 
(2) 
q Asked a company to remove you from any lists they use for marketing purposes? (3) 
q Asked a company not to sell your name and address to another company? (4) 
q Asked a business you were dealing with about policies on the collection of consumer 
information? (5) 
q Purposefully gave incorrect information about yourself to a marketer? (6) 
q Purposefully gave incorrect information about yourself to a government agency? (7) 
q Read the online privacy policies at websites when making a purchase from a private 
company? (8) 
q Read the online privacy policies at government websites when sending them information 
electronically? (9) 
q None of the above (10) 
 
14) Have you personally, to the best your knowledge, ever experienced any of the 
following?  Check all that apply:  
q Detention at the border checkpoint resulting in a search (1) 
q Detention by airport officials resulting in not being able to board in the airplane (2) 
q Detention by airport officials resulting in being denied entry into a country (3) 
q Victim of identity theft (e.g. someone uses your name) (4) 
q Victims of credit card fraud (5) 
q Your personal information monitored by a government agency (6) 
q Your personal information monitored by an employer (7) 
q Your personal information sold by a commercial business (8) 
q None of the above (9) 
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15) When it comes to privacy, how worried are you about providing personal information on 
websites, such as your name, address, date of birth, gender?  
m Very worried (1) 
m Somewhat worried (2) 
m Not very worried (3) 
m Not sure (4) 
 
16) Who do you think should have the most say over how companies use their website to track 
people's activities and personal information online? Should it be: 
m Government (1) 
m Companies that run the websites (2) 
m People who use the websites (3) 
m Not sure (4) 
 
17) How much coverage have you seen or heard through the media (TV, radio, newspapers, 
magazines, online information, advertisements) regarding concerns about the safety of your 
personal information?  
m A lot of coverage (1) 
m Some coverage (2) 
m Not much coverage (3) 
m No coverage at all (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
 
18) In your opinion, would you say the media pays: 
q More attention to stories about terrorism (1) 
q More attention to stories about government violations of personal privacy of citizens (2) 
q More attention to stories about private sector violations of personal privacy of consumers (3) 
q Not sure (5) 
 
19) The United States government has enacted laws aimed at protecting national security. To 
what extent do you believe laws aimed at protecting national security are intrusive upon personal 
privacy? 
m Highly intrusive (1) 
m Somewhat intrusive (2) 
m Not very intrusive (3) 
m Not very intrusive at all (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
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20) To what extent do you think employers should be allowed to monitor their employees 
electronically with surveillance cameras? 
m Yes, it is the right of the employer under any circumstances (1) 
m Yes, but only for the purpose of evaluating the employee's performance (2) 
m Yes, but only the employee gives informed consent to be monitored (3) 
m No, under no circumstances should an employer monitor their employees (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
 
21) To what extent do you think employers should be allowed to monitor their employees 
electronically by being able to read the emails their employees send or receive on the employer's 
computer?  
m Yes, it is the right of the employer under any circumstances (1) 
m Yes, but only for the purpose of evaluating the employee's performance (2) 
m Yes, but only the employee gives informed consent to be monitored (3) 
m No, under no circumstances should an employer monitor their employees (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
 
22) Do you think the United States government should have the right to collect personal 
information about travelers? Would you say: 
m Yes, under any circumstances (1) 
m Yes, only if there is expressed consent by the affected traveler (2) 
m No, unless there is suspected wrong-doing by the traveler (3) 
m No, under no circumstances (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
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23) Please indicate if you support or oppose, moderately or strongly, police or intelligence 
agencies being able to do each of these things with a court order:  
 Support Strongly (1) 
Support 
Moderately (2) 
Oppose 
Moderately (3) 
Oppose Strongly 
(4) 
Scan the text of 
your email 
messages for 
information on 
your interests (1) 
m  m  m  m  
Track the content 
of your internet 
searches (2) 
m  m  m  m  
Obtain 
information on 
your website visits 
(3) 
m  m  m  m  
Obtain  
information on the 
contents of your 
social media (such 
as Facebook, 
Twitter, Linked-in 
etc.) (4) 
m  m  m  m  
Track your credit 
card purchases (5) m  m  m  m  
Track your 
whereabouts using 
the GPS signal 
from your phone 
(6) 
m  m  m  m  
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24) To what extent do you think it is appropriate for a government agency to share citizen's 
personal information with third parties, such as other government agencies, foreign governments 
and the private sector.  
 
 
 
Yes, it is the 
government's 
right under all 
circumstances 
(1) 
Yes, if the 
citizen is 
suspected of 
wrong-doing 
(2) 
Yes, as long as 
the 
government 
has expressed 
consent of the 
citizen (3) 
No, under no 
circumstances 
should the 
government 
share 
information 
about citizens 
(4) 
Not Sure (5) 
Other 
Government 
Agencies (1) 
m  m  m  m  m  
Foreign 
Governments 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  
Private Sector 
(3) m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
 
 
25) Many businesses create profiles about their customers that include information about 
purchasing habits, personal characteristics, and credit history. How acceptable to you would it be 
for a business to use information from your customer profile to inform you of products or 
services that they think would be of interest to you? Do you feel it is:  
m Very acceptable (1) 
m Somewhat acceptable (2) 
m Not really acceptable (3) 
m Not acceptable at all (4) 
m Not sure (5) 
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26) Please indicate if you support or oppose, moderately or strongly, companies whose service 
you are using being able to do each of the following: 
 
 
 Support Strongly (1) 
Support 
Moderately (2) 
Oppose 
Moderately (3) 
Oppose Strongly 
(4) 
Scan the text of 
your email 
messages for 
information on 
your interests (1) 
m  m  m  m  
Track the content 
of your internet 
searches (2) 
m  m  m  m  
Share information 
on your website 
visits (3) 
m  m  m  m  
Share information 
on the contents of 
your social media 
(such as 
Facebook, 
Twitter, Linked-in 
etc.) (4) 
m  m  m  m  
Track your credit 
card purchases (5) m  m  m  m  
Track your 
whereabouts using 
the GPS signal 
from your phone 
(6) 
m  m  m  m  
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27) To what extent do you think it is appropriate for a private sector organization to share 
citizen's personal information with third parties, such as the national government, foreign 
government, and other private sector organizations?  
 
 
 
Yes, it is the 
government's 
right under all 
circumstances 
(1) 
Yes, if the 
customer  is 
suspected of 
wrong-doing 
(2) 
Yes, as long as 
the 
organization  
has expressed 
consent of the 
customer (3) 
No, under no 
circumstances 
should 
organizations 
share 
information 
about their 
customers (4) 
Not Sure (5) 
National 
Government 
(1) 
m  m  m  m  m  
Other Private 
Sector 
Organizations 
(2) 
m  m  m  m  m  
Foreign 
Government 
(3) 
m  m  m  m  m  
 
 
31 Which of the following categories best defines your gender? 
m Male (1) 
m Female (2) 
m Other (3) 
 
32 Which of the following categories best describes your age?  
m 18-24 (1) 
m 25-34 (2) 
m 35-44 (3) 
m 45-54 (4) 
m 55+ (5) 
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33 Which of the following categories best describes your highest level of completed education?  
m Less than high school (1) 
m High school graduate (2) 
m Some college (3) 
m Associate's degree (4) 
m Bachelor's degree (5) 
m Post graduate degree (Master's or Ph.D.) (6) 
 
34 What is your religious preference? 
m None (1) 
m Protestant (10) 
m Catholic (2) 
m Jewish (3) 
m Christian (4) 
m Buddhism (5) 
m Hinduism (6) 
m Muslim/Islam (7) 
m Native American (8) 
m Other (Please Define) (9) ____________________ 
 
35 Which of the following categories best describes your annual household income? 
m Under $10,000 (1) 
m $10,000 to just under $30,000 (2) 
m $30,000 to just under $50,000 (3) 
m $50,000 to just under $70,000 (4) 
m $70,000 to just under $90,000 (5) 
m $100,000 and over (6) 
 
Please provide any feedback/comments you may have regarding this survey: 
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